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Abstract 
 
The continuous changes suffered by the concept of State Sovereignty in line with 
the growth of interdependence, lead to a greater concern on the part of States - as 
global actors - in the internal affairs of third parties, especially with regard to cases 
in which human rights are violated. However, the case of the Darfur humanitarian 
crisis, exposes, in addition to the wickedness of the State of Sudan – the main 
responsible for the events - the weakness of an international system focused on an 
anarchic organization, in which sovereignty is still the ultimate factor in deciding 
on intervention, even in cases of extreme atrocity. 
This dissertation proposes to make a critical analysis to the concept of State 
Sovereignty, trying to conclude why there are still countries that protect 
themselves behind this notion, exposing, more concretely, the consequences that 
its authoritarian application, by the government of Sudan, spawned in the region. 
For this reason, a theoretical concept, but with an executive approach, the R2P, is 
proposed as a resource for impunity that has persisted globally in the defense 
against human rights violations. 
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Resumo 
 
As contínuas alterações sofridas pelo conceito de Soberania de Estado em sintonia 
com o crescimento da interdependência, levam a uma maior preocupação por parte 
dos Estados - como atores globais - nos assuntos internos de terceiros, sobretudo 
no que diz respeito a casos em que são violados os direitos humanos dos seus 
cidadãos. No entanto, o caso da crise humanitária do Darfur, expõe, para além da 
impiedade do Estado do Sudão – responsável máximo pelos acontecimentos -, a 
fragilidade de um sistema internacional focado numa organização anárquica, em 
que a soberania é ainda fator derradeiro de decisão sobre intervenção, mesmo em 
casos de atrocidade extrema.  
Esta dissertação propõe-se fazer uma análise crítica ao conceito de Soberania de 
Estado, tentando concluir porque é que existem ainda países que se protegem por 
detrás desta noção, expondo, mais concretamente, as consequências que a sua 
aplicação autoritária, por parte do governo do Sudão, gerou na região. Por esta 
razão, é proposto um conceito teórico, mas de abordagem executiva, o R2P, como 
recurso à impunidade que vem persistindo globalmente na defesa contra violações 
de direitos humanos. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the last 70 years, rules and norms protecting people from the violation of their 
basic human rights have increased internationally to a point where the pressure 
generated on the actions of States, has changed the way they behave towards their 
citizens.1 Compliance with international general principles of law, subscribing to 
all sorts of treaties and agreements, has compelled States to sacrifice their 
sovereignty at the hands of the international community, in what concerns the 
respect for universal human rights.2  
But while most States have followed this path, some remain skeptic about their 
compromise with the international legal system. The mechanism that has allowed 
States to avoid their international responsibilities throughout centuries has been 
the concept of State Sovereignty. It has given state actors the power and authority 
to decide on any national issue, while avoiding any external interference, without 
practical consequences. Despite this, sovereignty has gone through immense 
change along the years, shifting into something much more flexible today, 
allowing international actors to enforce on States commitment and responsibility 
in averting violations of human rights, not only inside their borders, but also where 
intervention is deemed necessary. 
This change can be understood through two historical movements displayed in 
both political institutions and political thought. The first was the development of a 
system of sovereign States that culminated at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
while the second movement the restrictions set to the sovereign State, which began 
in practice after World War II, continuing since through the increase of 
 
1 “All states are subject to some degree of international human rights pressure, or demands that they comply 
with international norms (…), all states confront normative pressures for human rights compliance.” 
(Cardenas, 2007, pp.102) 
2 The universal human rights are a set of inalienable rights of people established in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10 th 1948. It 
recognizes “all human beings as born free and equal in dignity and rights” and with the “right to life, liberty 
and security of person”. (UN General Assembly, 1948) 
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interdependence, regional integration and the strengthening of laws and practices 
protecting human rights. The changes inflicted on sovereignty after this second 
movement have generated space for other mechanisms of international law to 
emerge, founded on a principle of compliance. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, 
the starting question is: why have States become so attached to the concept of State 
Sovereignty? 
To answer this, this work has been divided into two parts: a theoretical part and a 
practical case. The first part will address the more philosophical questions, 
concerning both sovereignty and compliance with international law, throughout 
their existence. Also, after analyzing the theoretical approach to sovereignty, a 
simple challenge, created with the data retrieved for this investigation, will 
correlate the attachment to sovereignty and the actions of autocratic regimes, 
aiming to demonstrate what type of States today are the most devoted to defending 
their sovereignty. Lastly, a mechanism of compliance - Responsibility to Protect - 
will be examined, so as to understand why sovereignty can no longer be a 
justification for States’ actions, when they violate human rights. The second part 
will analyze the case of the Sudan, as an example of a State, notorious for its 
continuous violations of human rights, exempt of repercussions, with the objective 
of trying to determine why hasn’t the international community been able to act, 
despite possessing sufficient mechanisms to. 
By attempting to understand a country’s “grip” to the concept of State Sovereignty, 
analyzing both the theoretical framework and the practical case, we consider that 
sovereignty has been responsible for numerous human rights violations, by not 
allowing, in many circumstances, the intervention of the international community 
to avert these crimes. 
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2. The Concept of State Sovereignty in International Law 
 
International Law is centered on the concept of the State. In its turn, the State lies 
upon the foundation of Sovereignty, which expresses internally the supremacy of 
governmental institutions and externally the supremacy of the State as a legal 
person.3 Until recently, Sovereignty was regarded as an element of a particular 
individual in a State and not as an abstract manifestation of the existence and power 
of the State. The sovereign was considered to be the one “who decides on the 
exception”4, “a definable person, to whom allegiance was due.”5 However, the 
concept of State Sovereignty has become in many aspects an archaic idea in what 
is considered to be modern international law6, existing various elements that 
support its continuous decay, being the growing cooperation between states and 
their interdependence, the most relevant.  
 
Although a key principle of international law7, State Sovereignty is not universally 
defined by the international community, though some potential definitions have 
been provided: sovereignty “is a set of practices that are historically contingent – 
a mix of both international and intra-national processes, including self-
determination, international law, and ideas about natural right”8. Camilleri defines 
it as “a conception of a world divided into separate, independent communities, 
delineated clearly in time and space, governed by their own sovereign authority 
and system of law”. 9  It “implies control of an identifiable geographical space by 
 
3 Shaw, 2003  
4 Schmitt, 2005, pp.5 
5 Shaw 2003, pp. 622 
6 “Practical sovereignty is challenged by the problems facing human society at the dawn of the twenty-
first century, problems so great, so complex, that the sovereign state is to small a unit, the concept of 
sovereignty too archaic, to be of much practical use in solving them. (Harrison and Boyd, 2003, pp.28).  
7 “The principle of sovereignty, i.e. of supreme authority within a territory, is a pivotal principle of modern 
international law. What counts as sovereignty depends on the nature and structure of the international legal 
order and vice-versa.” (Besson, 2011) 
8 Howland and White, 2009, pp.1 
9 Camilleri, 1992, pp. 172 
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the state, as the supreme legal and political authority over a physical environment 
and its inhabitants”10.  
Krasner determines that there are four distinct ways in which the concept of 
Sovereignty is generally used: 
1) International legal sovereignty, which regards the establishment of each 
state’s political entity, as mutually recognized, in the international system;  
2) Westphalian sovereignty understood as an institutional method of 
organizing the political life on the principle of exclusion of external 
interference from the domestic structures responsible for applying 
authority;  
3) Domestic sovereignty, which refers to the organization of political 
authority within the state and the degree of control given to the state, and; 
4) Interdependence Sovereignty, which respects the state’s ability to control 
specific issues, such as capital and people across its borders. 11 
In addition to the fact that there has not been a unanimous agreement regarding the 
definition of State Sovereignty, the political and international systems have 
transformed so dramatically over the past centuries, that the concept itself could 
not remain untouched, shifting from time to time and adopting new approaches. 
As Grimm states, “it [sovereignty] was forced to adapt more than once to the great 
changes in the development of political rule. As a result, more than a few 
characteristics of the concept of sovereignty have changed their meaning over 
time, so that the continuing use of the term does not necessarily imply its content 
 
10 Litfin, 1998, pp.79 
11 The term sovereignty has been used in four different ways – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. “International legal sovereignty refers 
to the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal 
judicial independence. Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of 
external actors from authority structures within a given territory. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal 
organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective 
control within the borders of their own polity. Finally, interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of 
public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the 
borders of the state.” (Krasner, 1999) 
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remains the same”.12 But despite this necessary change, Fassbender recognizes that 
the concept of State Sovereignty has proved itself highly “adaptable” to the 
changes that have taken place in the international system, to ensure the 
preservation of mankind. 13 
Although sovereignty is shaped to be a tool used by state actors to safeguard the 
interests of the nation, Cassese argues that “[s]tate Sovereignty is not unfettered. 
Many international rules restrict it. In addition to treaty rules, which of course vary 
from State to State, limitations are imposed upon State sovereignty by customary 
rules. They are the natural legal consequence of the obligation to respect the 
sovereignty of other States”. 14 According to the author, one state cannot use its 
powers to interfere with any other state’s legal business, inside its territory, 
respecting the ideal of conformity with the independence of any foreign state15. 
More broadly, according to Cassese, a State may not: 
1) Impose its will on, or interfere with, or coerce a foreign State official; 
2) Interfere with foreign armed forces lawfully stationed on its territory; 
3) Perform coercive acts onboard a foreign military or public ship or aircraft. 
4)  Submit to the jurisdiction of its courts' foreign States for acts performed in 
their sovereign capacity; 
5)  Submit to the jurisdiction of its courts' foreign State agents for acts 
performed in their official capacity. 16 
The concept of State Sovereignty is amongst the most ancient of international law, 
following the rise of the modern nation-state. It has witnessed a great 
transformation and with it, it has adapted to the necessary requirements, evolving 
 
12 Grimm, 2015, pp.19 
13 “Throughout its long history, the concept of sovereignty has proved highly adaptable. It has survived 
many premature obituaries, and the charge that it stands in the way of a system of international governance 
adequate to ensure the future existence of humanity.” (Fassbender, 2003, pp.115) 
14 Cassese, 2005 
15 “A State may not exercise its sovereign powers over, or otherwise interfere with, actions legally 
performed by foreign States on its territory. This legal inability stems from the general principle imposing 
respect for the independence and dignity of foreign States” (Cassese, 2005) 
16 Cassese, 2005 
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into one of the most important instruments a state actor can have at its disposal to 
defend the interests of the sovereign. 
In the following sub-chapters, a theoretical groundwork will be addressed, offering 
a broad, but direct, analysis of the historical development of the concept of State 
Sovereignty, with the purpose of understanding: how it has evolved over the years; 
and the different levels of attachment States have had to it. Following this, a 
correlation between State Sovereignty and the behavior of authoritarian regimes 
will be investigated, as a starter for the practical case ahead, in order to demonstrate 
a determining factor in the dependence of States to the concept, that will lead to 
the succeeding chapters. 
2.1. From Ancient Times to the Treaty of Westphalia17 
The concept of State Sovereignty has been present as an integral principle of both 
national and international political order since early antiquity, though much has 
changed since then. During the classical period of international law, the question 
of why nations obey was similar to why nations should obey, and usually answered 
with reference to a higher law – the law of nature. Before the dominion of the 
Roman empire, religion served as the dominant source of the law between 
nations18, developing a direct connection between Church and State.  As stated by 
Dixon19, “[s]overeignty in the empire of Egypt, Rome, Greece, Persia and Babylon 
were clearly vested in the image of the ruler. It was his face that projected the 
political legitimacy and power of the empires”. 
 
17 The Treaty of Westphalia “is a collective name given to the settlements which the Imperial-Habsburg 
delegates drew up with France, at Munster, and with Sweden, at Osnabruck”, and that ended the Thirty 
Years’ War and the religious wars in Europe for centuries. “[A]llowed rulers to maintain the state religion 
of their choice and to direct the institutions of that religion but, at the same time, urged them to acknowledge 
the right of their subjects to practice minority religions in private.” (Lee, 1994, pp.91). It called for the 
recognition of sovereign states of territorial entities that could not be externally interfered with, a recognized 
population and a legitimate government. 
18 Koh, 1997 
19 Dixon, 2011, pp.13 
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The traditional understanding of the concept of State Sovereignty, before 
Westphalia, is credited to Jean Bodin’s 16th century definition of sovereignty, the 
absolute and lasting power of the state. According to the author, the concept of 
sovereignty encompasses the state’s absolute and exclusive ability to determine 
laws inside its territory, not recognizing another’s authority to do so as well.20 
Sovereignty, “he [Bodin] observed, was crucial to understanding many obscure 
and difficult questions about the république”. According to Bodin, sovereignty is 
composed of five distinct functions21: 
1) The establishment of magistrates and civil offices; 
2) The constitution of laws; 
3) Decision whether or not to go or to end armed conflict; 
4) Establishes the sovereign as the arbitrator of appeals; 
5) Institutes the sovereign with the power to award clemency when legal 
processes of justice are exhausted. 
The notion of customary practice of nations was introduced by Francisco Suárez, 
as an important supplementary source of rules in international law. The author is 
considered to be the first to establish a definite separation of international law from 
theology and ethics, considering it as an area of jurisprudence.22 
Lastly, Hugo Grotius was the first to define jus gentium23 not just as natural law, 
derived from right reason, but as a consequence of voluntary action, generated by 
independent operation of the human will. Grotius theorized the notion of 
 
20 Bartelson (1995) 
21 “Sovereignty, he urged, consisted in five functions. First and especially important was creating 
magistrates and defining each one’s office (una est ac praecipua in magistratibus creandis & officio 
cuiusque definiendo); secondly, making and annulling laws; thirdly, declaring and terminating war. 
Fourthly, the sovereign was the final adjudicator of appeals (prouocatione), and, finally, the ultimate arbiter 
of clemency in capital cases where possibilities of remission through the ordinary processes of law were 
exhausted.” (Lloyd, 2017, pp.83) 
22 Koh, 1997 
23 In Roman law jus gentium referred to the laws common to the various nations and people under the 
Roman Empire, used in cases between non-Roman citizens or between a Roman and a non-Roman 
citizen. In https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jus%20gentium  
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international society, as a community of those who participate in the international 
legal system, whose basic composition was international law.24 
Long before the Treaty of Westphalia, basic aspects of the international system, 
with regard to questions of sovereignty, were much different, whether we speak in 
terms of national or international perspectives. Much of the world was organized 
into city-states, particularly in the region of the East Mediterranean, where the 
concept of nation-state is born25. The power of the sovereign – monarch or emperor 
– was absolute, defined by a political authority of medieval hierarchy.  Religion – 
more specifically the Catholic Church - played a big part in ruling most of the 
European powers for centuries, becoming the unifying element in Europe’s 
medieval society26. Later, the birth of the Protestant Reformation “activated many 
of the existing vulnerabilities in early modern European rule”27, leading to 
religious wars that lasted years and that only ended with the Treaty of Westphalia. 
But despite the never-ending conflicts in Europe before 1648, they became 
essential to understand why compromising on a close acknowledgment28 of the 
concept of State Sovereignty was essential to establish a new international order 
in Europe, at least until the beginning of World War I, in 1914. As Philpott argues, 
“[i]t is indeed in the political history of the century prior to Westphalia that we best 
discern the tremendous historical significance of state sovereignty. State’ invasions 
of other states to alter their religious practices, the empire’s military assertions of 
religious uniformity – this religious war and its attendant abridgments of 
sovereignty were the chief sources of contention in European politics for over a 
 
24 Koh, 1997 
25 “Many consider the Greeks as the originators of the nation-state with the formation of the Greek city 
states.” (Dixon,2011, pp.14) 
26 “This is a system that in the pre-Westphalia phase was dominated by a central religious and legal authority 
and was composed of a number of entities of differing status in the system” (Simpson,2004, pp. 35). 
27 Nexon, 2009, pp.4 
28 Despite the fact that we are able to recognize the existence of a close understanding of what the concept 
of State Sovereignty means, specially between Western societies, the international community until this 
day has never issued a decisive and unanimous definition for it. 
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century (…) and [the Thirty Years’ War] proved the most destructive and 
protracted European war prior to the twentieth century”29. 
Traditional State Sovereignty has thus, been denoted as “the highest, final 
decision-making authority, which lent its holder power over others”30 – the 
supreme power of the state. But it is evident that the concept, prior to 1648, was 
perceived as subject of higher norms of hierarchical structures, rather than after 
Westphalia – where a concept vested with absolute and unlimited power emerged. 
2.2. The Treaty of Westphalia until the 20th Century 
The Treaty of Westphalia defined an important moment for international politics, 
especially for the powers in Central Europe. Some consider these settlements 
agreed to be the birth of modern State Sovereignty31. What Krasner describes as 
“an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two 
principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
authority structures. (…) Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external actors 
influence or determine domestic authority structures.” 32 
The treaty introduces an essential transformation in the relations between States, 
making all sovereignties equal33 “upon the eyes” of the international community, 
regardless of their religious faith – Catholic or Protestant - or form of government 
– republican or monarchical, thus ending the medieval structures of political 
authority hierarchically organized and based on inequality. This shift erases 
centuries of stratified ruling, turning into a no-ruler, all equal type of State 
Sovereignty.  
 
29 Philpott, 2001, pp.96 
30 Grimm, 2015, pp.14 
31 “The international state system and the modern state as we know it today, is rather young. The treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648 is said to be the beginning of the system of sovereign states.” (Pant,2011, pp.1)  
32 Krasner, 1999, pp.20 
33 Besson argues that “the establishment of a secular and territorial authority was secured thanks to the 
development of the principle of the sovereignty of States of equal power.” (Besson, 2011, pp.3) 
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Like argued by Simpson, “[t]he trajectory traced, in all this, describes a system 
developing out of the highly centralized and unequal relations that were the mark 
of the pre-Westphalian stage in international affairs to a Westphalian order in 
which the sovereign equality becomes a defining quality of the system. The 
transformation here is one from Empire to anarchy or from centralized hierarchy 
to sovereign equality”34. According to Larkins, “Westphalia symbolized a 
transformation from a system of political rule based in the hierarchical structures 
of medieval Christianity to one ordered in terms of independent sovereign 
territorial states: a transition from hierarchy to anarchy”35. In addition to marking 
“the origins of the modern, sovereign-territorial state system”36, Westphalia 
brought an “end to inter-state religious conflict in Europe”37, even uniting, in some 
cases, both religious factions to the same side, as allies38. 
Westphalia determines that domestic – and only domestic – authority is to dictate 
the policy of the state. As Krasner argues, “The fundamental norm of Westphalia 
sovereignty is that states exist in specific territories, within which domestic 
political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior”39. The introduction 
of an anarchical system, essential to the respect of a state’s national political 
authority inside its territory, was fundamental to stopping the conflicts that were 
consistent to that period, in Europe.  
Despite this, the anarchical system introduced, brought constant struggles for 
power in the European continent for centuries to come, with states fighting for their 
hegemony in the region, shifting the balance of power, leading to what were 
inevitable great conflicts in the 19th40 and the 20th41 centuries. The “fragmentation 
 
34 Simpson, 2004, pp.35 
35 Larkins, 2010, pp.3 
36 Nexon, 2009, pp.2 
37 Nexon, 2009, pp.2 
38 Nexon (2009, pp.3) argues that “Westphalia allowed Catholic and Protestant powers to become allies, 
leading to a number of major secular geopolitical realignments”38. 
39 Krasner, 1999, pp.20 
40 The Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) 
41 World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1949) 
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of political authority among a group of states42” was key to this new international 
system, representing “a rejection of government in the form of a common, supreme 
authority”43. Another key aspect to it, was the principle of non-intervention, where 
“a state is free to determine its own political, economic, religious, and cultural 
systems”44 without consideration from another state, and together, both the 
principle of sovereignty and of non-intervention where fundamental to enhance the 
anarchical behavior of states.45 
With regard to what was previously established, one can question how can 
international law have a role in the interaction of states, if such domestic political 
authority, inspired by self-preservation, exists. According to Fidler, 
“[i]nternational law is a Westphalian governance process through which the states 
create, and consent to be bound by, certain rules of behavior in connection with 
their anarchical interactions”46. This means that, to some extent, states will 
cooperate in order to abide by a specific group of rules, internationally recognized, 
as long as one country doesn’t interfere in the business of a second country, without 
the latter’s permission. 
The international system, as established by the Treaty of Westphalia, has proven 
to be very complex. There is no higher authority, no universal actor capable of 
solving disputes and, at times, that has shown to be an imperfection of the system 
itself. The most threatening47 aspect to Westphalia’s concept of State Sovereignty, 
is actually related to one of its most appealing features – the absence of an authority 
through a hierarchical system. This means that, even though the international 
system no longer works through hierarchies, less powerful countries won’t stop 
 
42 Fidler, 2004, pp.23 
43 Fidler, 2004, pp.23 
44 Fidler, 2004, pp.23 
45 Fildler states that “With governance within states rendered off limits by the sovereignty and non-
intervention principles, Westphalian governance involved managing state interaction in anarchy” (Fidler, 
2004, pp.23) 
46 Fidler, 2004, pp.23 
47 The expression “threatening” cannot be interpreted as having a bad effect on the states that have their 
sovereignty influenced by others, meaning that it is only threatening to the concept itself and not, in all 
cases, to the country which isn’t free of external influence. 
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being exposed to the influence and determination of stronger states.48 In fact, 
Krasner argues that “Westphalian sovereignty has been violated through 
intervention; more powerful states have coerced their weaker counterparts into 
altering the domestic institutional arrangements of their polities”49, for their own 
benefit. 
The concept of State Sovereignty established in the Treaty of Westphalia was 
essential to what came after for the European powers. For the next three centuries 
they fought in defense of their own sovereignty, in order to safeguard their 
presence in the region.  As Yafei argues, “[f]rom the Peace Treaty of Westphalia 
to the end of WWI, there was no limitation on the use of force or the threat to use 
it by international law. Only after WWI and in particular after WWII did this […] 
come into question.”50  
As the international conflicts of the 21st century would later show, the traditional 
sovereign system of States is an insufficient institutional structure because “it does 
not offer adequate guarantees that citizens’ physical safety and liberties can be 
secured by government institutions alone”51. The second half of the 20th century 
would thus, bring great transformation to the international system concerning 
state’s respect for international law, while the concept of State Sovereignty would 
prove to be vulnerable to states’ new interdependence approach. 
2.3. The End of World War II, Interdependence and a new approach to the 
concept of State Sovereignty 
The Westphalian concept of State Sovereignty entails an attitude of non-
intervention with a State’s authority in its domestic policies, by another State. 
However, as the tragic events of WWI and WWII occurred in the first half of the 
 
48 Krasner (1999, pp.23) states that “Violations of Westphalian sovereignty can arise in a sovereign state 
system because the absence of a formal hierarchical system of authority, the defining characteristic of any 
international system, does not mean that the authority structures in any given political entity will be free of 
external influence”.  
49 Krasner, 1999, pp.25 
50 Yafei, 2018 
51 Pavel, 2014, pp.22 
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20th century, the international community started doubting the range of the 
concept, “not only as a result of the growing emergence of international human 
rights but, more significantly, the need for a more coordinated international 
response to various humanitarian crisis”52. As Magnuson argues, “[f]or the first 
time, the idea that international law should protect the rights of individuals started 
to gain traction in legal circles, leading to a proliferation of international human 
rights treaties in the postwar era.”53 
Jacobsen states that “[t]he internationalisation of the legal status of the human 
being became one of the most prominent features of the post-World War II period 
after the Nazi and fascist violations of elementary human rights. The post-World 
War II era was a period in which the freedom and independence of the state in law-
making was subjected to limitations by international law in respect of certain 
international interests.”54  
In some cases, sovereigns sacrificed some of their political authority, in order to 
introduce legislation preventing them from committing actions identified as human 
rights violations55 - an effective way of legitimizing their governance56. This 
sudden shift in the behavior of states and state actors is well explained by Krasner, 
as he argues that “[i]n some instances rulers endorsed human rights conventions 
not because they had the intention or even ability to implement their precepts, but 
because such agreements were part of a cognitive script that defined appropriate 
behavior for a modern state in the late twentieth century”57. 
 
52 McMahon, 2013, pp.1 
53 Magnuson, 2010, pp. 257 
54 Jacobsen, 2008, pp. 218 
55 As Krasner (1999, pp.24) argues, “After the Second World War it was preferable for the rulers of western 
Europe to sign the European Human Rights Convention, which compromised their Westphalian 
sovereignty, than to insist that the domestic autonomy of their polities be unconstrained.” 
56 “Human rights are important not only for input-oriented legitimacy of democratic decision-making 
processes (…) but also for output-oriented effectiveness of economic resources (…) which are essential 
preconditions for protection and enjoyment of most human rights.” (Walker,2003) 
57 Krasner, 1999, pp.106) 
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Due to this, after World War II, the number of treaties and conventions “dealing 
with political rights and with social and economic rights, as well as accords on 
more specific issues such as slavery, women, children, refugees, stateless persons, 
genocide, and torture”58 grew. In fact, even though that before World War II 
human rights agreements between states and international organizations were 
almost inexistent, after the conflict, their number increased immensely becoming 
of great importance to the international community59 - even greater than minority 
rights60, ensuring “the premise that sovereign states are not free to abuse their own 
citizens with impunity”61.  
This proved to have a tremendous effect on the international system, demonstrating 
a radical attitude change from states, as human rights progress became one of the 
most important issues of the last century, specifically after World War II62. 
Probably the biggest shift in the behavior of international actors that resulted from 
the tragic effects of World War II, concerning State Sovereignty, was a defensive 
stance, from these – whether States, organizations or other political actors – 
regarding that “international human rights operate to check the exercise of internal 
sovereign power […] whether one understands human rights from a moral, 
political, or legal perspective”63. 
From this moment forward - and once again -, the concept of State Sovereignty 
was forced to adapt to the new international system, becoming exposed to the 
 
58 Krasner (1999, pp.31) 
59 “Until the conclusion of the Second World War, human rights, which stipulated the rights of human 
beings in their status as individuals or as part of class that was not a source of basic identity (such as 
refugees), were less salient than minority rights. Before this time only the abolition of slavery and the slave 
trade in the nineteenth century and some International Labour Organization agreements in the interwar 
period emphasized human, as opposed to, minority rights. There are now, however, more than twenty 
United Nations human rights agreements as well as accords associated with specialized international 
organizations and with regional groups.”  (Krasner, 1999, pp.105) 
60 “After the Second World War the focus on minority rights was supplanted by an emphasis on human 
rights, a reflection both of the failure of the interwar minorities regime and of the preferences of the leaders 
of the United States, the most powerful state in the postwar world and of western Europe as well.” (Krasner, 
1999, pp.105) 
61 Jacobsen, 2008, pp. 2018 
62 “The focus on individual rights is a phenomenon of the twentieth century. International human rights 
agreements have proliferated since the Second World War.” (Krasner,1999, pp.109) 
63 Macklem, 2015, pp. 33 
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intentions of the international community, with the objective of preventing further 
violations of human rights, even if committed by a political authority inside the 
borders of a sovereign state.  
The face of this change was the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) that despite 
much criticism64, was according to Hegarty, fundamental for two distinct reasons. 
“First, it recognized, formally, that human rights have an international dimension 
and are no longer solely a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a State; 
and, secondly, it granted the United Nations (UN) the legal authority to embark 
upon a codification of human rights which led to the drafting of what was the 
world’s first international human rights document, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights65”66. 
The principle of absolute sovereignty had thus shifted to a more relative concept 
of sovereignty, where States recognize the need to embrace an international 
community, increasingly interdependent, organized in similar social and political 
conducts, while acknowledging “that the individual states are included in a pattern 
of relationships which necessarily imposes certain limitations upon their will to be 
autonomous”67. Intrinsic to the concept of relative sovereignty, interdependence 
“requires the existence of rules concerning inter-State relations. These rules cannot 
be those made by a single State. If every State claimed to make such rules, their 
inevitable non-acceptance by other States would lead to anarchy.” 68 
 
64 “The fact that the United Nations Charter’s provisions are so lacking in detail, and that the States which 
drafted the Charter probably never intended it to be legally binding, in view of their own vested interests…” 
(Hegarty,1999, pp.5)  
65 The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was adopted on December 1oth 1948 in the form of a 
resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly. It consists of 30 Articles regarding civil, 
political, social, economic and cultural rights, universally. 
66 Hegarty, 1999, pp.5 
67 De Visscher,1968, pp.30 
68 Seidl-Hohenveldern (1989, pp. 44) The author further adds that “rules on inter-State relations can only 
be rules recognized by all States participating in these relations, that is, in view of the present-day world-
wide interdependence, by all States of the globe. If a State was to be allowed to disregard these rules of 
international law, in view of its claim to be maser of its own destiny, there would no longer be ay reliable 
basis for the inter-State relations required by fact of the interdependence of the several sovereign States.”  
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As a result of the changes suffered by the concept of State Sovereignty, most States 
have abdicated the absolute power attributed to them by the traditional concept, 
encouraging a more analogous and relative one, reflected in the reciprocal respect 
and equality between states’ in the international stage, leading to the idea that 
States are now sovereign, not because they impose their own rules, but those of 
international law.69  
2.4. The changes to the concept of State Sovereignty entering the 21st century 
Reflecting on the changes to the concept of State Sovereignty, after World War II, 
the creation of international institutions such as the UN, in 1948, was fundamental 
to develop an interdependent space, where States abide, in principle, to the same 
basic laws. But despite this, to convince every State of being a part of an 
international organization founded on the premise that every member would have 
to comply with its laws, a few compromises had to be made in order to convince 
some more reluctant States to agree on entering this interdependent space. 
A considerable concession granted in order to unanimously create the UN was 
maintaining the Westphalian principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of a State by another State or States. We can find this in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter which provides that “(n)othing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdictions of any state or shall require the Members to submit to 
such matters to settlement under the present Charter”. Associated to this provision 
is Article 2(4) of the Charter stating that “(m)embers shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
purposes of the United Nations”70. Taking this into account, it was apparent that 
 
69 Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1989, pp.44 
70 United Nations - Charter of the United Nations, 1945. See also the Preamble to the 1970 Declaration of 
Principles of International Law (Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
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the concern with the concept of State Sovereignty manifested in these provisions 
was vital to the international community in the second half of the 20th century. 
Entering into the 21st century, due to the constant rise of international human rights 
issues, doubts concerning the broadness of the concept of State Sovereignty 
became larger, especially after the humanitarian crisis that occurred in the 1990’s 
in Srebrenica and Rwanda. After the internationally agreed compromise over the 
preservation of the principle of non-intervention in the past century, the atrocities 
occurred brought a dire need to change the perception of sovereignty by state 
actors, reminding them that despite the existence of such principle, the 
international community would still be responsible for intervening, for the sake of 
“international peace”, “security”, “prevention and removal of threats to that 
peace”71. As McMahon states, “[t]he twentieth century focus on sovereignty had 
not prevented the UN from engaging in humanitarian intervention but what was 
different for the twenty-first century was the perceived need to establish a series 
of principles that would guide such intervention to ensure consistency in UN 
action”72. 
The 21st century, with regards to human rights obligations, became synonymous 
with challenging the authority of states, being that the growing importance of the 
concept of universal jurisdiction73 was fundamental to this issue. Under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction a State is entitled or even required to bring 
accounts in respect of specific serious crimes, regardless of the location of the 
crime, and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim74, allowing 
 
Charter of the UN) which states: …the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from 
military, political, economic or any other form of coercing aimed against the political independence or 
territorial integrity of any State. GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
71 United Nations - Charter of the United Nations, 1945. (Article 1)  
72 McMahon, 2013, pp.2 
73 “The doctrine of universal jurisdiction is used to authorize domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
serious international crimes, like piracy, genocide, war crimes, slave trade and other crimes against 
humanity. Universal jurisdiction means a State, without any jurisdictional bond, exercising jurisdiction over 
a crime on behalf of global community.” (Ramdhass, 2018, pp.2) 
74 Kamminga, 2001 
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for the trial of international crimes, committed by any person in any part of the 
world. Regarding this concept, the most notable cases were those brought against 
Ariel Sharon in Belgium and Augusto Pinochet in Spain, using universal 
jurisdiction has a tool to “seek to obtain custody of a defendant for crimes 
committed far from the nation and court seeking to try him or her”75. 
According to Sriram, “[t]he exercise of universal jurisdiction may constitute a 
significant challenge to national sovereignty and may constitute a deviation from 
the principle, enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of states”76, but despite this, Ramdhass argues that universal 
jurisdiction has evolved for two reasons: “first to punish the crimes that are grave 
and harmful to the entire international community; and second, to ensure that no 
safe haven is available to those who have committed serious crimes”77.  
States differ in opinion regarding the use of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, 
as countries from the developing world have different assessments comparing to 
the one’s of the developed countries, though both believe strongly in the proper 
application of universal jurisdiction against any actor - or actors - responsible for 
violations of national or international laws.78 This might come because of the lack 
of unanimous definition as to the circumstances in which the concept can be 
applied, leading to more conflictive relationships inside the international 
community. Subsequently, the legality and legitimacy of the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction is still a doubt in international law. 
The concept of universal jurisdiction will be portrayed later in Chapter 5, where 
its features will be analyzed exclusively for the particular case of Sudan. 
A parallel doctrine to the one of universal jurisdiction in challenging the 
sovereignty of states is the political commitment of Responsibility to Protect 
 
75 Sriram, 2006, pp. 13 
76 Sriram, 2006, pp. 13 
77 Ramdhass, 2018, pp.2 
78 Ramdhass, 2018, pp.4 
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(R2P)79, “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation 
– but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be 
borne by the broader community of states”80. A starting point to the principles 
previously argued by McMahon was the 2001 Report of International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the initiative responsible for the 
introduction of R2P. 
Following the lead of the international community, concerning human rights 
obligations and its implications on the concept of State Sovereignty, the ICISS 
report states that “[i]t is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual 
responsibility: externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, 
to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state”81. By 
focusing the debate on the political commitment of the R2P, the ICISS fixates the 
debate on “the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal 
safety and human dignity” safeguarding anyone against “the omnipresent enemies 
of good health and other real threats to human security on a daily basis”82.  
The principle of responsibility has thus become an important tool to protect people 
from internationally recognized crimes, such as those that constitute as human 
rights violations. As Ramdhass argues, we can determine the existence of at least 
four different types of responsibility: State responsibility, individual 
responsibility, collective responsibility, and command or superior responsibility. 
They are put into action if the rights of a person, or collective group of people is 
affected, or if it violates the legal commitments one has towards others. As the 
 
79 The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is a set of principles based on the idea that “States sovereignty 
implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state 
itself.” Also, “[w]here a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” (International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001)  
80 ICISS, 2001, pp.9  
81 ICISS, 2001, pp. 8 
82 ICISS, 2001, pp.15 
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author argues, “[s]tate has the primary responsibility to protect human values to 
the citizens of foreign as well as domestic”83, thus demonstrating that the principle 
of responsibility bolsters the strength that the concept of universal jurisdiction has 
over both domestic and international courts and tribunals.84  
The topic of the R2P will be developed more extensively in the subsequent 
chapters, when we analyze, in depth, its influence on the growth of States’ 
compliance with international law, in what concerns their human rights 
obligations. 
2.5. The Correlation between State Sovereignty and the actions of autocratic 
regimes 
After all the research completed, as well as the information collected on 
Sovereignty, this sub-chapter will help answer the starting question of why do 
countries get attached do the concept of sovereignty?  This study has assisted in 
determining that there is a political element directly connected not only to the 
concept of State Sovereignty, but also to its continuous safeguard and perception 
of indispensability – autocratic regimes. Therefore, this sub-chapter intends to 
display a correlation between the concept of State Sovereignty and countries led 
by autocratic regimes.  
My research on the subject of State Sovereignty and States’ Compliance, with 
regard to international human rights, has led me to conclude that autocratic regimes 
tend to actually use the concept of State Sovereignty as a form of protection from 
both international intervention and prosecution, for various human rights 
violations. In other words, autocratic regimes are susceptible to judge the costs of 
losing their sovereignty as too great to adopt international human rights 
procedures.85  
 
83 Ramdhass, 2018, pp.4 
84 Ramdhass, 2018, pp. 4 
85 Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2011 
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As stated by Hafner-Burton, Mansfield and Pevehouse, “[o]f all regimes, 
autocracies (and autocratizing countries) have the weakest incentives to join high 
cost human rights institutions”. Defending the implementation of these institutions 
is grounding for the establishment of a democratic regime. By allowing the 
admission of human rights institutions, compromising high levels of sovereignty, 
it improves the levels of legitimacy and credibility of the State’s responsibility 
towards the development of democracy.  
Diverging from this, according to the authors, both established democracies and 
dictatorial regimes have fewer motives to embrace such high cost institutions, 
since the impact these same costs have, are far to damaging to their sovereignty, 
entailing costs that these States are not willing to bare.86  
Although democracies are included in this claim, the theoretical reason for this 
addition is entirely different than the one regarding dictatorships, standing 
important to separate the two. 
Democracies - not including emerging democracies87-, in some cases, are likely to 
resist binding commitments because as established democracies they have already 
proven their commitment towards the respect for human rights, becoming 
unwilling to stand even greater costs on their sovereignty stemming from 
contributing for the development of human rights institutions.88 Autocracies, as 
well, are likely to stay away from contributing to “high-sovereignty-cost 
institutions”, but for completely different reasons. For these dictatorial regimes, 
first, there is no motivation in protecting human rights, by entrusting their political 
 
86 “[m]ature democracies and dictatorships have less reason to join such high cost institutions because 
membership infringes on their sovereignty and requires them to commit resources, with few corresponding 
benefits.” (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2011, pp. 2) 
87 Emerging Democracies are best defined by three specific characteristics: “First, the level of inequality in 
emerging democracies is higher than that in advanced democracies. Second, the variance of inequality 
among emerging democracies is high. Finally, the independent variables that we deal with seem to 
correlated with the level of inequality”. (Kawanaka and Hazama, 2016)  
88 “Because established democracies have already demonstrated a respect for human rights, they are 
generally reluctant to bear the sovereignty costs stemming from participation in human rights institutions.” 
(Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2011, pp. 3) 
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authority to an international institution that could jeopardize their position, by 
means of sentencing for their violations.  
In certain situations, leaders of autocratic regimes may join these institutions, not 
because of their actual interest in the protection of human rights, but because 
benefits associated with this cooperation may be enough to counterbalance the 
costs of membership.89 
In some cases, the precision with which we can perceive a country’s support for 
human rights is debilitated if countries join “lower-cost institutions”90. Generally, 
“such institutions lack strong enforcement mechanisms, contain imprecise or low 
levels of obligation, participation sends a less credible signal about a government’s 
intentions to treat citizens humanely than membership in a higher cost 
institution”91. 
As Moravcski argues, “international human rights institutions are not designed 
primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across 
borders, but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities”92. 
That’s probably why state leaders pursue binding commitments to human rights 
institutions, such as the ECHR or the ICCPR, when the uncertainty of the 
effectiveness of future human rights policies is greater than the sovereignty costs93 
of membership.94  
In sum, in what concerns human rights obligations, authoritarian regimes are less 
likely to relinquish their State Sovereignty. In most cases, the simple idea of 
sharing their political authority, whether with a national or international body, is 
 
89 Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2011.  
90 “Autocracies should also enter less frequently, preferring lower-cost institutions that facilitate cheap 
talk.” (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2011 
91 Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2011 
92 Moravcski, 2003, pp.217 
93 “Various studies refer to the costs that states bear when they surrender discretion over national policies 
in order to adhere to the standards set by an international institution as sovereignty costs”. (Hafner-Burton, 
Mansfield, Pevehouse:2011) 
94 Moravcski, 2003 
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deterrent enough to withdraw from any sort of human rights agreement. This 
absence of power sharing and opening to the international community only brings 
great difficulty to the cause of those fighting for universal and inalienable rights in 
their country.  
Provisions to adjudicate human rights on an international level, thus, poses a vital 
test not just to the traditional concept of Westphalian sovereignty that motivates 
the classical approach to international law, but also to liberal principles of 
democratic legitimacy and self-rule.95 The difference between democracies and 
autocratic regimes rests in the “empowerment of individual citizens to bring suit 
to challenge the domestic activities of their own government”96. 
2.6. Chapter Conclusion 
This first chapter of the thesis aimed to introduce the concept of State Sovereignty, 
through a chronological analysis. In this conclusion, I would like to provide a 
concise answer to the previously stated questions. On how it has evolved over the 
years, we determined that until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the relation 
between States was much different, having an impact on how sovereignty was 
perceived – still an absolute power of the ruler, but within a system of hierarchical 
structures where stronger States didn’t have to respect the individual authority of 
others. From Westphalia, sovereignty became based on exclusive authority inside 
a State’s territory and on a policy of non-intervention in domestic issues, 
transitioning from a hierarchical to an anarchical system and ending the religious 
wars in Europe. For some scholars, this was the birth of the subject of International 
Relations.97 Then, came the tragic events of WWI and WWII and the international 
community recognized that interdependence was a solution to avert conflicts and 
protect humanity. Finally, entering the 21st century, after the mass atrocities of the 
 
95 Moravcski, 2003 
96 Moravcsik, 2003, pp. 217 
97 “It [Westphalia] is the Beginning. The Beginning of international politics. Before that, we were told, 
there was no sovereignty, there were no states, and there certainly was no international system”. 
Gofas, Hamati-Ataya, Onuf, 2018, pp. 225) 
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1990’s - as result of divisions laid by an extent number of independencies - 
measures to protect the rights of citizens, threaten by conflict gained a reinforced 
influence, forever altering the “inviolability” of sovereignty, if such rights are 
abused.  
The second question, on the understanding of the different levels of attachment 
States have had to sovereignty, the Treaty of Westphalia was fundamental because 
from it, States gained a new kind of power, which was something they had all 
along – their domestic authority without external interference. This increased 
drastically the importance States gave to the concept. This lasted until the end of 
WWII, when the international community, concerned with the effects domestic 
issues had on the perception of other States, decreasing gradually and until today, 
the dependence of States towards the concept of State Sovereignty. 
This chapter was not an attempt to answer the question of what sovereignty is; 
rather it tries to understand how the concept has evolved through history, how 
States have been affected by it and how States have transformed it. By doing this, 
the overall objective of this thesis becomes clearer, providing an opening for 
human rights obligation to have a greater and more effective impact on the shaping 
of State Sovereignty, in the future.  
 
3. State Compliance with International Law 
 
This chapter will briefly examine the concept of State Compliance within 
international law, serving as an introduction to the following chapter on the 
concept of Responsibility to Protect, central to the transformation inflicted to State 
Sovereignty in the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter will present a brief 
historical context of compliance from the classical era of international law to the 
period right after the Treaty of Westphalia, two distinct periods with great 
influence on the foundations of the concept. Also, the chapter will explore what is 
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compliance and what it means to comply with international law, as well as 
investigating how compliance with these same laws as affected the perception on 
State Sovereignty. Ultimately, this chapter will explore the question of why do 
States obey international law?98, as a bridge towards the succeeding chapter.  
3.1. Historical Background on compliance 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a partially religious answer was given to the 
question of why nations should comply with international law – the law of nature 
-, of which international law was a component. Then, the establishment of jus 
gentium in Roman law by emperor Gaius was fundamental to ascertain a “law 
common to all men”, as a system of equity between Romans and foreigners.99 
After the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia, the concern shifted from “why 
should nations comply” to “what national rulers should do”, viewing the subject 
of compliance as ethical and philosophical, rather than scientific or empirical. 
Within this new system, the notion of legal obligation emerged as bedrock for 
distinguishing customary international law from voluntary acts that States might 
conform but are able to neglect.100 The concept of obligatory custom “assumed 
that nations, by virtue of their sovereign statehood, had de facto consented to 
compliance with customary practices out of a sense of legal obligation.”101 
Immanuel Kant, with regard to compliance, recommended State actors to follow 
international law as a route to “perpetual peace”. Kant interpreted international law 
as a system toward securing peace, justice and democracy, focused on the 
significance of human rights. The philosopher argued, not for a world government, 
but for “a law-governed international society among sovereign states, in which the 
 
98 It is understood that not all States obey, respect or even recognize some or most international sources of 
law, whether treaties, resolutions, or even peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). After all, 
this thesis concerns one of those States. However, for the purpose of this study, a broad overview will be 
constructed due to the large difference that exists between countries that do, and countries that do not obey 
international law. 
99 Koh, 1997, pp.2604  
100 Koh, 1997, pp. 2607 
101 Koh, 1997, pp.2608 
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strong ties existing among individuals create mutual interests that cut across 
national lines”.102 Kant believed that “the existing transnational ties would create 
a moral interdependence, and lead to greater possibilities for peace through 
international agreement”.103 
Today, State Compliance, though not unanimously consented as a concept inside 
international law, has become a parallel notion to State Sovereignty104- in what 
concerns the respect for human rights obligations - providing a framework capable 
of averting serious violations to these rights. The subject of States’ compliance 
with international law has most recently become one of the key subjects of 
academic investigation in the field105. Complying with internationally adopted 
laws concerning the rights of every citizen, as brought many alterations to the 
behavior of most States. Human rights are, today, universal rights which every 
State has an obligation to guarantee to its people, along with many other civil and 
social liberties, rewarding them with legitimacy and acceptability in the eyes of 
the international community. 
As the influence of international law on States is generally debated with regard to 
“compliance with international law”106, we can question, what is compliance?  
3.2. Defining what is State Compliance 
Compliance refers to the conformity of behavior of States with a specified legal 
rule of international scope. It does not necessarily require a cause-effect 
relationship between a specific rule and a standard behavior of a State. Compliance 
doesn’t imply any aspect of implementation or enforcement towards a State. These 
 
102 Koh, 1997, pp.2610 
103 Koh, 1997, pp.2610 
104 This argument has no intention of making a comparison between the concepts of State Compliance and 
State Sovereignty. It’s recognized that one is not the opposite of the other and that Sovereignty is a right of 
every State. Despite this, it is argued – as stated in the previous chapter - that countries that compromise 
their political authority for the commitment to international laws regarding human rights, are more likely 
to respect these rights, contrasting to those who don’t commit on compromising their national sovereignty. 
105 Alkoby, 2008 
106 Guzman, 2008, pp.22 
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refer to a process of putting obligations into practice, whether nationally or 
internationally, denoting a more coercive meaning.107 It can also be defined as “a 
state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule”108, 
distinguished from what Mitchell109 considers to be “treaty-induced compliance”, 
which describes a behavior that occurs because of a specific treaty’s compliance 
system. Franck stresses that compliance with international law is “a function of the 
normative acceptance of international rules”110, reflecting their uniformity with 
domestic standards.111 It “refers to the degree to which states adjust their behavior 
to the provisions contained in the international agreements they have entered 
into”112. 
Despite the fact that the concept of State Compliance has not always been a central 
subject of great research by the international community, conjectures about what 
it means to comply with international rules and norms or about why States 
increasingly abide by international laws, have always been around the academic 
world, whether in social sciences disciplines or in the field of law.113 These 
assumptions are generally related to what Keohane defines as “the puzzle of 
compliance”, the reason “why governments, seeking to promote their own 
interests, ever comply with rules that are not in their immediate self-interest”114. 
So far, experts regarding international law and international relations’ studies have 
not been able to present a suitable model capable of explaining why States comply 
with international law in some situations and violate it in others. Though we know 
that State Compliance exists because political actors are concerned with 
reputational implications and direct sanctions, associated with violating 
 
107 Nollkaemper, 2012 
108 Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002, pp.539 
109 Mitchell, 1993, pp. 328 
110 Moravcsik, 2003, pp.224 
111 Franck, 1988 
112 Lutmar and Carneiro, 2018, pp. 2 
113 Goodman and Pegram, 2012, pp.31 
114 Keohane,1984, pp.99 
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international law, failing to understand the reasons behind why some comply while 
others don’t, has delayed the progress of the international legal system115. 
The following sub-chapters will focus on how can States demonstrate their 
compliance with international law and on the reasons behind why countries obey 
with international law. 
3.3. Determining how and why do States comply with International Law 
In the modern international system, every State is, to some extent, obligated to 
justify their actions – in what concerns human rights - according to the rules and 
norms agreed by the international community116. This sub-chapter will analyze the 
scope to which most States have become – and rightly so - progressively compliant 
towards international law. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia and 
of the UN Charter - though in completely different periods - have established the 
traditional principles of international law, based on territoriality and State’s 
political authority. Entering in the 21st century, after the terrible events of the 
previous century and as a result of the evolving processes of globalization117 – 
technology, communication and others – international rules and norms have 
themselves become more global. Significant transformations had taken place with 
regard to the international legal landscape, underlined by the continuous increase 
of: the number of international institutions and regimes; of States ever more 
concerned with incidences outside their own borders; of non-state actors and of the 
interconnective relation between domestic and international legal systems. All 
unveiling a period of rapidly growing transnational relations.  
 
115 Guzman, 2001 
116 “[T]he State in exercising its right to establish laws and administrative regulations must comply with its 
legal obligations under international law”. (Butler,1987, pp.91) 
117 “Globalization is a widely and somewhat loosely used term, intended to describe the recent and rapid 
process of intercontinental economic, social, and political integration. This worldwide integration allows 
people to communicate, travel and invest internationally, and helps companies marker their produces 
widely, acquire capital and human and material resources more efficiently, share advanced technology, and 
enjoy economics of scale.” (Wells, Shuey, Jiely, 2001) 
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A recognizable outcome in the behavior of States, towards complying with their 
human rights obligations, was the adaptation of their national laws to those 
internationally recognized, for the protection of these same rights. A nation with 
international ambitions generates moral obligations to conform with international 
norms, that subsequently become internally binding legal responsibilities once 
these transnational standards have been adopted into its domestic legal system. 
Global actors are thus, more likely to comply with international law when they 
consent to its legitimacy through an internal process of approving said 
legislation118.  
Sources of international law, which comprise of treaty law, international 
customary law and general principles of law are fundamental to the process of 
compliance with international law, as they bind States either through signed and 
ratified documents (treaties, conventions…) or through peremptory norms (jus 
cogens). Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
establishes, under its jurisdiction, that the court, whose function is to decide in 
accordance with international law, shall apply:119 
a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting state; 
b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d) […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
Thus, participating in any form of international agreement with respect to values 
such as international peace, security and protection of human rights, as well as 
 
118 Koh, 1997 
119 United Nations - Statute of the International Court of Justice. 18 April 1946 (Article 38) 
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abiding by its dictums is the most effective way of complying with international 
law, leaving the doubt of why a State should do it. 
 
So, as Young questioned: “[w]hy is it that an actor acquires and feels some sense 
of obligation to conform its behavior to the dictates or requirements of a regime or 
an institution?”120 In other words, why do nations comply with international 
law?121 
3.4. Why do countries comply with international law? 
In the modern era, the debate around why States comply with international law 
directly relates to Austin’s statement that international law cannot be considered 
actual law because, unlike domestic rules, international legal regulations are not 
yet imposed by a coercive political authority – a sovereign122. Nonetheless, the 
number of international human rights institutions and countries contributing to the 
development of humanitarian laws has increased considerably since the end of 
WWII123. 
This progress has generated discussion over why States willingly choose to take 
part on these international commitments, as they’re intended to monitor 
compliance with human rights standards.124 Moreover, contributing to the 
protection of human rights and the development of human rights institutions – 
sources of obligation, precision, and delegation – establish significant restraints on 
the sovereignty of their members125.  
 
120 International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges (remarks by Oran R. Young), 
1992 
121 Koh (1997) 
122 “The duties which [international law] imposes," Austin wrote, "are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear 
on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its 
probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received and respected.” (Austin, 2009, pp.171) 
123 Annex 1- Human Rights Institutions and Democratization 
124 Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, Pevehouse (2011) 
125 Abbott and Snidal (2000) 
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As the study on theories of compliance is extent, this thesis will not focus too much 
on the subject, but just enough to concisely analyze the work of a few scholars that 
tackle some explanations for complying with international law.126 Chayes & 
Chayes determine that States comply with international law simply based on the 
treaty regimes127 they are part of, what they define as the “managerial model”.128 
According to the authors, States obey not because they feel threatened or any other 
reason, but because they believe it is in their interest to remain committed to the 
treaty regimes to which they belong. Through this model, domestic actors pursue 
the promotion of compliance, not through coercion or institutionalization, but 
through a cooperative model of compliance, which tries to encourage compliance 
patterns through justification, discourse and persuasion129. Ultimately, if the aim 
is for better implementation of international rules, voluntarily complying, instead 
of forced compliance, is the more desirable mechanism to guarantee the greater 
number of obedience towards international law. If States establish internally, 
international ruling to be reasonable, their more likely to comply with it because, 
as argued by Chayes & Chayes, “if nations must regularly justify their actions to 
treaty partners in terms of treaty norms (…) it is more likely that those nations will 
voluntarily comply with those norms”130. 
Alternatively, Franck claims that the reason States comply with international law 
is not as the “managerial model” describes, but about the elements of fairness and 
justice in the international legal system that compel States to obey. States are 
consequently more inclined to “obey powerless rules” because legitimacy plays a 
big part in compliance issues.131 The notion of legitimacy is fundamental for the 
 
126 For a more comprehensive study on the issue, see Chayes & Chayes (1995), Franck (1990) and Koh 
(1997) 
127 Chayes & Chayes (1995, pp.2 ) state that “treaties are at the center of the cooperative regimes by which 
states and their citizens seek to regulate major common problems”, thus concluding that the expression 
“treaty regime” is a collective system centered around a set of treaties – the main structure of the authors’ 
“managerial model”.  
128 Chayes & Chayes, 1995, pp.3   
129 Koh (1997) 
130 Koh, 1997, pp. 2645 
131 Franck, 1990 
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improvement of interdependence and cooperation between nations, aimed at both 
States and international laws. In an international community, established through 
rules and norms, compliance is secured through the perception of rules as being 
legitimate by those to whom they’re addressed132. As to States - particularly 
concerning customary international law – legitimacy has a direct impact on the 
way States behave, for the reason that every State relies on the fact that all others 
shall commit to honoring a mutual agreement. Failing to respect such 
responsibility will damage a State’s legitimacy, indicating its unwillingness to 
comply with its obligations. 
According to Koh, the Chayes’ managerial model and Franck’s fairness approach 
have historically defended the discipline against two divergent claims: “on the one 
hand, the realist charge that international law is not really law, because it cannot 
be enforced; on the other hand, the rationalistic claim that nations “obey” 
international law only to the extent that it serves national self-interest.”133 Thus, 
both sides, though distinct, present a valuable case for the reason why States 
comply with international law. 
3.5. Chapter Conclusion 
To its own question, quoted at the end of sub-chapter 3.3., on why nations obey 
international law? Young answers that “there are differences in being obligated to 
do something because of a moral reason, a normative reason and a legal reason”.134 
About Young’s remarks, Koh argues “that these moral, normative, and legal 
reasons are in fact conjoined in the concept of obedience. A transnational actor’s 
moral obligation to obey an international norm becomes an internally binding 
domestic legal obligation when that norm has been interpreted and internalized 
into its domestic legal system.”135 
 
132 Franck, 1988 
133 Koh, 1997, pp. 2602 
134 Young, 1992 in Koh, 1997, pp. 2659 
135 Koh, 1997 
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Recognized has anything but novel, domestic compliance to internalized global 
law has respected historical roots. Interpreting global norms and internalizing them 
into domestic law, leads to the rebuilding of national interests and national 
identities.136 With centuries of content to investigate on this issue, motives on why 
States comply with international law have changed – some have become extinct, 
while others emerged -, but the it’s an irrefutable fact that the number of nations 
that have become compliant, regarding most international norms, has consistently 
risen. Thus, furthering the development of transnational legal processes can 
supplement the understanding on why nations have, throughout history, become 
more and more compliant to international law.137 
A crucial part to that development has been the concept that will be presented in 
the next Chapter.  
 
4. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
 
Just before entering the 21st century, the 1990’s witnessed levels of violence and 
brutality only comparable to those seen during World War II. Throughout this long 
period of time, States have largely failed to act consistently with their 
responsibilities as signatories of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), evidencing the 
international community’s “contentious history when it comes to preventing and 
halting mass atrocities”138. 
In international law, doctrine has still an important role despite the closing gap 
between international legal theory and that of practical legal life. The inexistence 
of a central legislator – a supra organization responsible for establishing the rules 
 
136 Koh, 1997 
137 Koh, 1997 
138 Stark, 2011, pp. 4  
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of the international legal system –, adding to the fact that state actions are often 
contradictory and inconsequential, doctrine can fill an important gap by 
developing central structures in what is seen as a chaotic legal reality.139 This can 
justify, or at least partly explain, why the introduction of new concepts and 
approaches became so popular in the more recent times. As Hipold so accurately 
states, “new ideas can change the way international law is seen and, in the end, on 
a practical level, the very substance of the law”140.  
The following chapter will focus on the analysis of a concept that is part of this 
new wave of legal practices, responsible for focusing on matters of accountability 
and commitment to the respect of human rights obligations – Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P). Before focusing on the concept, a quick approach will be made to 
the notion of humanitarian intervention, identifying its main dilemma, in order to 
understand the indispensability of new mechanisms such as R2P. This will be 
followed by an analysis on the concept, through the understanding of its 
upbringing, its structure, and at last trying to understand under which 
circumstances can the concept of R2P be executed by the international community.    
4.1. Questioning humanitarian intervention 
By observing the legal mechanisms responsible for coping with humanitarian 
intervention, its easily identifiable in the UN Charter, that Articles 2(4) and 2(7), 
establish a prohibition on “the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state”141, or “to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”142, clearly establishing a 
principle of non-intervention. This is built around the idea, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, that sovereign States have an individual responsibility to exercise law, 
 
139 Hipold, 2014 
140 Hipold, 2014, pp. 2 
141 United Nations- Charter of the United Nations. 1945, Article 2(4) 
142 United Nations- Charter of the United Nations. 1945, Article 2(7) 
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promote human rights and prevent human rights violations, as an obligation 
imposed by the human rights treaties, they are a part of. 
Unfortunately, some States are, sometimes, not able or willing to satisfy their 
responsibilities, and even though the UN Security Council (UNSC) has the ability 
to approve a military intervention on any State, as established in Article 39 of the 
UN Charter143, it is often unable to take quick and effective measures. In past 
circumstances of gross human rights violations, a third party – a State or group of 
States – as taken the initiative to stop these violations through force – sanctioned 
or not by the UNSC – and without the permission of the State that has committed 
or allowed human rights violations in its territory. This has mistrusted, not only 
the legality, but also the legitimacy of these interventions, because, even though 
the moral and political justifications might be correct, many consider humanitarian 
intervention has having a negative implication when we speak of coercive 
measure, as it “can be invoked as a cover for military operations of different nature 
[and] the position of international law may be […] undermined if it does not 
provide for intervention in cases of […] violations of universally accepted human 
rights”.144 Essentially, this morally accepted concept of humanitarian intervention 
with barely any legal foundations faces both the principle of non-intervention and 
the recognition of territorial sovereignty.  
4.2. R2P: a new alternative to humanitarian intervention 
With the beginning of the 21st century, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated 
that: “[…] if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault in 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violation of human rights that affect every precept of our common 
humanity?”145  
 
143 United Nations- Charter of the United Nations. 1945, Article 39  
144 AIV; CAVV - Advisory Report 13: Humanitarian Intervention. Advisory Committee on Issues of Public 
International Law, 2000. 
145 ICISS, 2001, pp. VII 
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It was only in the early 2000’s when the international community, embarrassed by 
its failure to act in the face of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as well as 
by the problems humanitarian intervention was facing, introduced a broad 
framework of policies aimed at preventing the continuance of mass atrocities and 
human rights violations. 
Emerging from a Report drafted by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established in 2000 as an initiative of the Canadian 
Government and adopted at the UN’s World Summit Outcome in 2005, the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) refers to the obligations of States regarding the 
protection of their population from crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity146, entailing the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means147. As a 
result, a state that neglects to take its responsibility cannot claim the violation of 
its sovereignty if the international community acts on behalf of said state, therefore 
pressuring States to comply with their human rights obligations. 
4.3. The three pillars of R2P 
The ICISS attributed three main pillars to R2P – “not just the responsibility to react 
to an actual or apprehended human catastrophe, but the responsibility to prevent 
it, and the responsibility to rebuild after the event”148. 
4.3.1. Responsibility to Prevent 
 
The first pillar of the R2P is the responsibility to prevent. This means that the 
“[p]revention of deadly conflict and other forms of man-made catastrophe is, as 
with all other aspects of the responsibility to protect, first and foremost the 
responsibility of sovereign states, and the communities and institutions within 
 
146 UN Generally Assembly - World Summit Outcome Resolution, 2005, pp. 30 
147 Moon, 2009  
148 ICISS, 2001, pp. 17 
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them.”149 The commitment displayed by a State is assessed through its efforts “to 
ensure accountability and good governance, protect human rights, promote social 
and economic development and ensure a fair distribution of resources point toward 
the necessary means”.150 
In spite of this, avoiding conflict is not just a task on the national level, as it is 
within the benefit of the international community to prevent national calamities, in 
order to maintain international peace and security. Strengthening the rule of law as 
well as human rights, providing economic and development assistance, or 
supporting initiatives to increase good governance are, largely speaking, ways in 
which the international community can demonstrate its commitment in providing 
support to States in internal conflict and, in return, gain credibility from said State. 
This is fundamental in cases where prevention has been unsuccessful, and the use 
of armed forces is required. 
Responsibility to prevent is essential to the well-functioning of R2P, as its primary 
importance is duly emphasized151. Preventing a conflict or an atrocity from 
occurring is crucial - “to be ready to act […] and not just in the aftermath of 
disaster”.152 
4.3.2. Responsibility to React 
 
This pillar is essential, not only to the concept of R2P, but to provide this paper 
with a more concrete response on one of its central points – understanding how the 
international community can overlap a State’s sovereignty, if it violates its 
international commitments, particularly its human rights obligations. 
The second pillar of responsibility to react suggests from the start, that there is a a 
situation where preventive measures have failed to stop a disaster responsible for 
 
149 ICISS, 2001, pp. 19 
150 ICISS, 2001, pp. 19 
151 “Prevention” is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect”. (ICISS, 2001, pp. 
XI) 
152 ICISS, 2001, p. 27 
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mass atrocities, and where military intervention is seen as a last resort in situations 
where the human rights violations are severe. In the exceptional circumstances in 
which a threat to human security cannot be prevented, the R2P determines that the 
response of the international community should shift from less intrusive action to 
coercive measures and only in the more radical cases, “which shock the conscience 
of mankind”153, would there be military intervention.154  
The unsuccess of the first pillar of preventive measures to avoid or contain a 
humanitarian crisis or conflict does not indicate military action as the only 
effective measure. Apart from armed reactions, other coercive methods may be 
related to judicial, economic or political sanctions.155 Previous to pondering 
coercive measures, every other possibility towards resolving the conflict has to be 
discarded, through the use of these sanctions. In cases where there is a need for 
military intervention, the situation has to be severe and the verdict to take military 
action has to be considered besides other methods of intervention. In matters of 
military intervention, the international community is split into States that pursue 
more intervention and States that favor minimal intervention, but in order to avoid 
lack of an understanding – that only tends to delay critical decisions and increase 
human suffering – it is fundamental to find common ground for both preventing 
and reacting to mass human rights violations.156  
Carrying out a military intervention “directly interferes with the capacity of a 
domestic authority to operate on its own territory”157. To understand the impact of 
such an extreme measure, it is important to identify what comprises a case so 
severe that the employment of military action is justified, starting by the principle 
of non-intervention. As mentioned previously on Chapter 1, the principle of non-
interference is that no sovereign State shall interfere in each other’s internal affairs, 
 
153 ICISS, 2001, pp. 31 
154 McMahon, 2013 
155 ICISS, 2001 
156 ICISS, 2001 
157 ICISS, 2001, pp. 29 
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comprising a mutual respect for the sovereignty of States and territorial integration, 
which we can conclude to be the States’ concern in preserving order and peace in 
the regions that surround them. Under exceptional situations, and within the 
welfare of the international community it is justified to react if a State does not 
respect its obligations of maintaining peace and order, as it has been acknowledged 
that “even in states where there was the strongest opposition to infringements on 
sovereignty, there was general acceptance that there must be limited exceptions to 
the non-intervention rule for certain kind of emergencies”.158 
Despite the Commission recognizing, through its Report, that “there is no 
universally accepted single list”, six criteria were highlighted for such action to be 
authorized: “right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional 
means and reasonable prospects”159. From this list, significant notice is given to 
the “just cause” criteria, having the Report considered that “military intervention 
for human protection purposes is justified in two based sets of circumstances, 
namely in order to halt or avert: 
- large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or 
not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect 
or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or 
- large scale “ethnic cleansing”, actual or apprehended, whether carried 
out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”160  
The carrying out of such military intervention can only be authorized by the 
UNSC, with an understanding between the permanent members not to exercise 
their veto power, however, in the event of a disagreement amongst members, it 
was proposed that the General Assembly could act through the 1950 Uniting for 
 
158 ICISS, 2001, pp. 31 
159 ICISS, 2001, pp. 32 
160 ICISS, 2001, pp. 32 
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Peace Resolution (Resolution 377 A (V))161 162, allowing it to accelerate the 
process of decision-making and consequent intervention, so as to minimize any 
further threats to human security.  
Despite the fact that the terms large scale loss of life and large scale ethnic 
cleansing are fundamental in the establishment of the just cause threshold in the 
Principles for Military Intervention, it is difficult to quantify a minimum required 
to be contained in those groups, as the ICISS report doesn’t specify. Military 
intervention can be perceived as a measure of anticipation to large scale killings 
because if not, the international community would be forced to wait until serious 
violations, such as the crime of genocide occur, in order to act. Concerning this, it 
is indifferent whether an international reaction is needed in a undemocratic or 
collapsed State, or in a democratically represented State. According to the UN 
Charter, the UNSC can authorize any intervention if there is a threat to 
international peace and security.163 The report and its just cause criterion exclude 
other situations that fall “short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing”, such as 
systematic racial discrimination, systematic imprisonment or other repression of 
political opponents, that “do not in the Commission’s view justify military action 
for human protection purposes”.164 In cases where there is a clear expression for a 
democratic regime, where democratic values are rejected by a military take-over, 
or in the case of democratic government being overthrown, the report recognizes 
that the UNSC “is prepared to authorize military intervention (including by a 
 
161 The Resolution establishes that, “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act 
of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” United Nations General Assembly - Uniting for peace, 3 November 1950, pp. 10 
162 McMahon, 2013 
163 “This reflects our confidence that, in extreme conscience-shocking cases of the kind with which we are 
concerned, the element of threat to international peace and security, required under Chapter VII of the 
Charter as a precondition for Security Council authorization of military intervention, will be usually found 
to exist.” (ICISS, 2001, pp 33) 
164 ICISS, 2001, pp. 34 
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regional organization) on traditional international peace and security grounds”.165 
There can also arise circumstances where the overthrown government expressly 
requests military support, which can clearly be given within the scope of the self-
defense provision in Article 51 of the UN Charter166, however the report states that 
military intervention for human protection purposes should be limited to situations 
“where large scale loss of civilian life or ethnic cleansing is threatened or taking 
place”.167 
The responsibility to react is of the three pillars of R2P the most debated. It is 
difficult to build a consensus within the international community as to establish 
one singular structure for coercive military intervention, when human rights 
violations are committed. But it is also important to understand that every reaction 
by the international community, that holds either sanctions or military intervention, 
will be a unique case so even though the guidelines should be the same, every case 
should be treated differently, so as to better identify and respect the different 
aspects of each situation. 
 
4.3.3. Responsibility to Rebuild 
 
The third and final pillar of R2P is responsibility to rebuild. This means that 
responsibility to protect implies not only prevention and reaction but also a 
responsibility to see through and rebuild. If a military intervention is taken, for any 
of the reasons stated in the previous sub-chapter, in the aftermath, there should be 
an equal important commitment in “helping to build a durable peace, and 
promoting good governance and sustainable development”.168 
 
165 ICISS, 2001, pp. 34 
166 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. (UN Charter, 1945, Art.51) 
167 ICISS, 2001, pp. 34 
168 ICISS, 2001. Pp. 39 
Using the case of Sudan to understand how countries are still able, through the concept 
of State Sovereignty, to protect themselves from their human rights obligations. 
 
 
42 
 
An essential priority after any military intervention is to guarantee that sufficient 
funds for reconstruction and rebuilding are provided, so as to guarantee an 
effective process of rebuilding. Also, working closely with local authorities in 
order to ensure public safety and security with the goal of establishing stability in 
the region. That is why, after a military intervention is succeeded, it is fundamental 
to have a “post-intervention strategy”.169 The main objective of this strategy, no 
matter the distinctiveness of every case, should be to make sure that the 
circumstances that lead to a military intervention do not repeat themselves.  
As the report recognizes, the most fruitful reconciliation processes do not 
necessarily occur through high level political dialogue or through judicial 
processes. The most accurate reconciliation “is best generated by ground level 
reconstruction efforts, […] occurs with sustained daily efforts at repairing 
infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting and harvesting, and cooperating 
in other productive activities.”170 That is why both the process and the 
responsibility for rebuilding does not rest on the shoulders of leaders, state actors 
or truth and reconciliation commissions, but anyone involved with, dedicated to, 
and that benefits from the process of rebuilding.171 
In 1998 the UN Secretary-General introduced a structure for post-conflict 
peacebuilding missions, in his report on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion 
of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa172, after identifying “the 
need for a concerted international effort to promote peace and security in 
Africa”.173 This report introduces the foundations for following interventions that 
succeed any military action. It highlights the need for consolidation of peace and 
preventing a recurrence of armed confrontation; the creation or strengthening of 
national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for 
 
169 ICISS 5.3 
170 ICISS, 2001, pp. 39 
171 Sarkin, 2015  
172 UN Secretary General, 1998 
173 UN Secretary General, 1998, pp. 3 
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reintegration and rehabilitation programs, as well as creating conditions for 
resumed development. 
Issues like security and justice in the region are crucial in a post-intervention 
mission. Successfully disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating local military and 
security forces is an important element of this process of rebuilding. Also, an 
operational judicial system has to be applied in order to deliver justice to the 
region, which can be a difficult job, since it is imperative that the intervening actor 
prevents any human rights violations from happening. Chapter XII of the UN 
Charter states that the UN “shall establish under its authority an international 
trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories”174, 
providing the guiding principles for intervening States behavior in military 
interventions and peacebuilding missions through the promotion of “political, 
economic, social and educational advancement […] and their progressive 
development towards self-government or independence”; the encouragement for 
the “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction”; ensuring “equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial 
matters […] and also equal treatment […] in the administration of justice”.175 
Rebuilding is much a responsibility as preventing or reacting and, as it was stated 
previously in the sub-chapter of responsibility to react, rebuilding is also a very 
unique process and though guidelines have been developed, peacebuilding and 
reconciliation in rebuilding States deserve each process to be specific to a 
country’s condition.176 
The three pillars of R2P demonstrate how the notion of humanitarian intervention 
has become dated, even though its purpose is still of tremendous importance. The 
concept of R2P presents a new and more direct approach, attributing 
 
174 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 75) 
175 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 76) 
176 Sarkin (2015, pp.97) states that “Countries embarking on reconciliation processes can learn from each 
other but need to understand that each process has to be specific to that country’s situation.” 
Using the case of Sudan to understand how countries are still able, through the concept 
of State Sovereignty, to protect themselves from their human rights obligations. 
 
 
44 
 
responsibilities to the international community and making it accountable for any 
inaction in cases of human rights violations. 
4.3.4. The Element of Right Authority 
 
The element of right authority – one of the six criteria for military intervention 
mentioned in the sub-chapter on responsibility to react – is a vital part since it deals 
with the party – or parties – who make the decision to intervene with military action 
and infringe another State’s sovereign right to territorial integrity. So, who has the 
right to determine whether a military intervention for human protection purposes 
should be conducted?177 
As stated previously in the chapter on State Sovereignty, the UN Charter states in 
Articles 2(4) and 2(7), that the UN or any State is prohibited to interfere in any 
other State’s domestic jurisdiction, recalling the principle of non-intervention. But 
opposite to this, Article 24(1) provides that “[i]n order to ensure prompt and 
effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”178, 
meaning that the SC has as obligation to use its powers to their full extent, in order 
to preserve an environment of peace and security. Furthermore, Article 39 
specifies that the SC “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, or decide what measures shall be taken 
[…], to maintain or restore international peace and security”.179 The ability granted 
by Article 39 to the SC does not include the use of force, like Article 41, which 
mentions that “measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be 
employed”180, however if the SC finds the measures provided for in Article 41 
inadequate, “it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary 
 
177 ICISS, 2001, pp. 47 
178 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 24(1)) 
179 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 39) 
180 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 41) 
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to maintain or restore international peace and security”.181 As observed by the 
ICISS report, the general provisions of Chapter VII, the specific approval of self-
defense in Article 51 and the provisions of Chapter VIII, collectively establish a 
formidable source of authority to deal with security threats of all types.182 
The UN is regarded as the main authority of the international community, as the 
UN Charter provides the legal foundations concerning military interventions.183 
But, the UN must not be recognized as a source of coercive power, but by its role 
as the applicator of legitimacy.184 As legitimacy links the exercise of authority and 
the resort to power, the UN can be identified as an universally recognized system 
responsible for enforcing international law. In addition, a few facts working in 
favor of increasing the UN’s legitimacy: the fact that the UN cannot enforce a 
military intervention, as an independent UN military does not exist and, therefore, 
it is reliant on the resources of its member, as well as their will to approve its 
decisions. 
When analyzing the right authority, the UNSC’s role is decisive. As the report 
states, the UNSC is the suitable organization for deciding on the overriding of a 
State’s Sovereignty. However, the veto power of its members can prove a difficult 
challenge, as one veto can override the others on matters of grave humanitarian 
concern.185 As a political organization, the UNSC has limited effectiveness, since 
its authority remains on implementing the provisions of the Charter, however, if 
the UNSC fails to respond to gross human rights violations, the General Assembly 
has, in very exceptional cases, with a two-thirds majority, the legitimacy to decide 
on military interventions.186 Additionally, regional collective intervention from 
organizations from surrounding States is also an option, since their interest in the 
 
181 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 42) Also, Article 51 describes the right for self-defense against a UN member 
state.  
182 ICISS, 2001, pp. 48. It is not only the SC which deals with peace and security maintenance. Articles 
10 and 11 of the UN Charter give the General Assembly of the UN the ability to make non-binding 
recommendations for the preservation of peace and security.  
183 ICISS, 2001, pp. 48 
184 ICISS, 2001, pp. 48 
185 ICISS, 2001, pp. 51 
186 ICISS, 2001, pp. 53 
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situation might be increased if a current of refugees or rebel groups arises and such 
neighboring States will thus have a strong collective interest in dealing with the 
catastrophe.187 The UN Charter provides legal credentials for such regional 
organizations in Article 52, where is stated that nothing “precludes the existence 
of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
maintenance of international peace and security”.188 Some exceptions, such as 
interventions led by individual states or a group of states, not grounded on any 
decision taken by the UN, have happened in the past, but only as exceptional cases, 
as actions led with the authority of the UN would be preferable. This issue raises 
the main problem of decision-making inside the UN, specially in the UNSC. In 
many cases, the difficulty in finding unanimously consensus, triggers an 
international crying towards the necessity of those same exceptions, if conducted 
for the right reasons.189 
The concept of R2P has been developing itself into an international legal norm, 
representing “progress towards the replacement of sovereign impunity with a 
culture of national and international responsibility and accountability”.190 Its 
source in international law is treaty and custom centered, and can be employed to 
international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 
ethnic cleansing191 – recognized as peremptory norms of jus cogens. Therefore, 
“preventing these crimes is an obligation under international law that is binding on 
all states whether or not they have signed or ratified any treaty.”192 
 
4.4. Crimes invoking R2P 
 
187 ICISS, 2001, pp. 53 
188 UN Charter, 1945 (Article 52) 
189 ICISS, 2001, pp. 54 
190 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp.541 
191 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp.541 
192With the exception of “ethnic cleansing”, which is not defined in international law, all crimes referred to 
in the R2P documents are codified in various conventions and statutes in international law (Barbour and 
Gorlick, 2008, pp.54) 
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The 2005 World Summit Outcome report, adopted at an unparalleled assembly of 
Member States of the UN, demonstrated broad acceptance to the application of this 
new concept, R2P. The participants of this event agreed, at a minimum, that R2P 
“is an emerging international legal norm that recognizes an obligation on states 
and the international community to protect potential victims from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”193, thus determining which 
crimes invoke R2P. Beyond this crimes, R2P cannot be applied as it could become 
destructive to the concept itself.194 It was therefore limited to the context of these 
four terrible crimes as there is a comprehensive agreement and acknowledgement 
of the need to prevent and address them.195 
4.4.1. Genocide 
 
The UN General Assembly unanimously passed, on December 11th 1946, the 
Resolution 96(I) that condemned genocide as “the denial of the right of existence 
of entire human groups”.196 On December 9th, 1948, the same Assembly 
unanimously passed Genocide Convention. In its Article II, the Convention 
determines that genocide means any act “committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.197 
As an advisory opinion on the Genocide Convention, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) understood that “the principles underlying the Convention are 
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on states, even 
without any conventional obligation”, further agreeing the universal nature of both 
 
193 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp.535 
194 “It is important to recognize that R2P is uniquely intended for cases of threatened or actual mass atrocity: 
genocide, large scale ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. R2P itself cannot be 
applied beyond that limited context. To do so would be plainly wrong and damaging to R2P itself.” 
(Axworthy and Rock, 2008, pp. 64) 
195 “R2P was limited to the context of these four egregious crimes as there is broad agreement and 
recognition of the need to prevent and address them.” (Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp 541) 
196 United Nations- General Assembly, The Crime of Genocide. 11 December 1946, A/RES/96. 
197 United Nations- General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. 9 December 1948 (Article 2). 
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the condemnation of genocide and of the cooperation required, so as to free 
humanity from such an horrendous crime.198 Consequently, according to the ICJ, 
the Convention mainly confirms pre-existing legal obligations that amount to 
international jus cogens199, meaning that States are “obliged to take all measures 
within their power to prevent the crime of genocide”.200 The ICJ has even specified 
that a State can be held responsible in situations where it fails to employ all 
measures within its control which might contribute to preventing acts of genocide 
before it really materializes.201 The purpose of the Convention includes specific 
action on both prevention and punishment of crimes of genocide, with Article VIII 
allowing any contracting party to call upon the competent organs of the UN to take 
such action under the UN Charter, as they consider appropriate for the prevention 
and suppression of acts of genocide, attempts to commit genocide, incitement, 
complicity in genocide, or conspiracy to commit genocide.202 
4.4.2. War Crimes 
 
Laws on war have existed for centuries. But eventually, international humanitarian 
law (IHL) was codified in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions203 and in the 1977 
Additional Protocols204, each containing a list of grave breaches that can be 
committed in both international and non-international armed conflicts.205 
Preceding the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions of 1907 established 
 
198 International Court of Justice, 1951. 
199 Méndez, 2007  
200 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp. 542 
201 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp. 542 
202 United Nations- General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. 9 December 1948 (Article 3 and 8). 
203 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
1949. 
204 Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; Protocol Additional (No. II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 
205 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
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the pre-existing laws and customs of war, identified by the Nuremberg Tribunal as 
“recognized by all civilized nations, […] regarded as being declaratory of the laws 
and customs of war…”.206 But, it is the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal that 
defined war crimes as:  
“[…] violations of the laws or customs of war […] including, but not limited to, 
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners 
of war or persons of the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity.”207 
More recently, the Rome Statute has established the most current definition of war 
crimes. In Article, the Statute determined that war crimes include “[g]rave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, […] acts against 
persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Convention”, 
which include willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; willfully causing great 
suffering, as among several other enumerated crimes.208  
Until today, numerous international criminal tribunals have been established with 
jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. From time-limited 
tribunals established by resolutions of the UNSC such as the ICTY and the ICTR; 
to hybrid tribunals established by bi-lateral treaties between the host State and the 
UN such as the ECCC209 in Cambodia, the Special Court of Sierra Leone, and the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon; and to special panels set up by an interim UN civil 
administration and peacekeeping mission such as those established as part of the 
 
206 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp. 543 
 
207 United Nations - Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the 
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"),1945. 
208  UN General Assembly - Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010). 17 
July 1998. (Article 8) 
209 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed 
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (ECCC). 
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UN Transitional Administration Mission in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); and finally, the permanent 
court established by the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC).210  
Both the responsibility and the precedent set by these international criminal courts 
is a strong sign of progress in the development of international law.211 Despite the 
questionable effectiveness of these international criminal institutions, whether 
regarding the limited number of convictions to date or its still fragile ability in 
preventing future crimes, despite significant financial cost, it is unquestionable that 
these tribunals “serve an important and necessary function [as they will] continue 
to play a key role in the promotion of international criminal, humanitarian and 
human rights law”.212 
4.4.3. Ethnic Cleansing 
 
As previously stated, the term ethnic cleansing is not defined in international law. 
However, the concept is well incorporated within the definition of crimes against 
humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC,213 and in Article 5 of the 
Statute of the ICTY.214 It is evident that this concept and the other three core 
international crimes of the R2P end up overlapping each other, with ethnic 
cleansing often falling under the definitions for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
or fit into specific war crimes.215 
 
210 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
211 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp.545 
212 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008, pp. 545 
213 “Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court” UN General Assembly - Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (last amended 2010). 17 July 1998. (Article 7). 
214 “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following 
crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed 
against any civilian population: […] (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds” UN Security 
Council - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,1993. (Article 5(h)).  
215 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
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Following the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the term ethnic cleansing was 
established within the terminology of IHL.216 The UN General Assembly, through 
resolution 46/242, recognized and condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing, 
which it constituted as “a grave and serious violation of international humanitarian 
law”.217 It further states that what was occurring in the region was a “concerted 
effort by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the acquiescence of, and at 
least support from, the Yugoslav People’s Army, to create “ethnically pure” 
regions”.218 In resolution 47/80, the General Assembly “reiterates its conviction 
that those who commit or order the commission of acts of ethnic cleansing are 
individually responsible and should be brought to justice.219 
4.4.4. Crimes against humanity 
 
The undertaking of crimes against humanity entails the execution or commission 
of mass atrocities, aimed at any civilian population. Even though no specific source 
of international law as specialized in crimes against humanity, this core 
international crime has been included in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal220, 
the Statute of the ICTY221, the Statute of the ICTR222, and more recently in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC223, among other sources.224 
 
216 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
217 UN General Assembly The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly. 25 August 1992. A/RES/46/242.  
218 UN General Assembly The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: resolution, 1992.  
219 UN General Assembly - Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Ethnic cleansing and racial 
hatred, 1992. 
220 “The Tribunal […] shall have the power to try and punish persons who, […] committed any of the 
following crimes […] (c) Crimes against humanity” in United Nations - Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis ("London Agreement"),1945. Article 6 (c) 
221 UN Security Council - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,1993. 
(Article 5).  
222 UN Security Council, 1994.  
223 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. (Article 7) 
224 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
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Its first definition in Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal defines 
crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against civilian population, before or during the 
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”.225 This 
definition required that the crime be perpetrated be connected with war and with 
another crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.226 
The definition provided by the ICTY included “the following crimes when 
committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
directed against any civilian population: murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecution on political; racial and 
religious grounds; other inhumane acts.”227 Just like the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, it is required a connection to armed conflict, though no connection to any 
other crime is required.228 
The ICTR definition establishes that the following crimes are considered as crimes 
against humanity “when committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; 
rape; persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; other inhumane 
acts.”229 In cases ruled by the ICTR, what is required in a connection to widespread 
or systematic attack against the civilian population, while it is not required a 
connection with an armed conflict.230 
At last, the Rome Statute definition was drafted to include:  
 
225 United Nations- Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 1945. (Article 6 (c)) 
226 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
227 UN Security Council - Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,1993. 
(Article 5). 
228 Barbour and Gorlick, 2008 
229 UN Security Council, 1994 
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“[T]he following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder; 
(b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of 
population; (e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) persecutions against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, national ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized 
as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in 
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) enforced 
disappearance of persons; (j) the crime of apartheid; (k) other inhumane acts of a 
similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
to mental or physical health.”231 
This definition attempts to cover an extensive selection of potential mass atrocities, 
while not requiring any connection with armed conflict. The evolution that is 
visible in the prevention of this specific crime, through these sources of 
international law, gradually converts it into an even more unique and identifiable 
case. Crimes against humanity are part of jus cogens and thus, all States share a 
responsibility in prosecuting and assisting in securing the evidence needed to 
prosecute such crimes.232 
4.5. R2P: Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter on R2P was designed to, after the analysis on State Sovereignty, 
present a modern mechanism, at the hands of the international community, that 
determines State Sovereignty not only as an exclusive right of the sovereign, the 
ultimate authority over the territory of the State, but also as a responsibility for the 
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protection of its people. Thus, where a population is suffering serious harm, 
inflicted by the State, or the State is unwilling or unable to stop it, its sovereign 
entitlement to the non-intervention of external actors yields to the international 
community’s responsibility to protect.  
It has been identified that only under what specific circumstances can the 
international community invoke R2P. Those are the core international crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Through its 
second pillar – responsibility to react – R2P establishes a list of six criteria to the 
non-intervention principle, under which R2P can be executed. The criterium of 
Right Authority has been emphasized so as to understand who in the international 
community has the authority to decide on a military intervention. As we 
determined, the UNSC has the sole responsibility in that matter, requiring a 
unanimous decision to determine any action. 
The concept of R2P is still a very young mechanism in an international system that 
has existed for centuries and that is becoming more complex every day. However, 
R2P should be recognized for the progress it expresses, towards developing 
international legal standards which focus on international protection, 
accountability, as well as the prevention of future occurrences of mass atrocities 
and serious human rights violations.233 It is astonishing how exceptionally fast the 
doctrine of R2P has grown and the signs it shows of how much further it can 
develop. Because of this, it is essential to demand that its application be swift, 
effective and recurrence-free. The international community – especially power 
organizations such as the UN - must be very consistent in its references to the 
doctrine. It’s the only way to build a general acceptance of R2P among its member 
States. 
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5. The Case of Sudan 
 
After the theoretical part of this thesis, this chapter will focus on a practical case 
in order to understand, in a more distinctive way, some of the answers that might 
be behind our starting question, why are countries so attached to the concept of 
sovereignty? 
This chapter is about Sudan. At the time this thesis was initiated the former 
government of Sudan was still in power for almost 30 years. But despite a change 
in power, since the events that highpoint this chapter occurred during the 
administration of the previous regime, the latter will be presented as if it were the 
current government. Only the concluding chapter of this work will address the 
present executive, mentioning it in its closing remarks. 
This specific country was chosen for a number of reasons: first, the longevity with 
which the same head of State has governed Sudan, without interruption; and 
second, the undisputed violations of human rights that have taken place in the 
country for several years, while the government proved incapable or unwilling to 
stop them, without contestation. Both reasons are directly connected to the main 
subject of this thesis since they demonstrate the level of authority held by the 
sovereign in such countries. Other reasons are related to the historical construction 
of the country, that will be presented in the succeeding sub-chapters; the social 
divisions inside the country due to ethnic and religious differences – essential in 
understanding the reasons behind the continuous human rights violations; and 
ultimately, the existence of an enormous economic potential as a result of a vast 
number of natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, uranium, and copper234, 
proving that despite many years of conflict and disorder, the country encompasses 
the ability to reverse its trajectory and become one of Africa’s strongest 
economies. 
 
234 Oppong, 2010 
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Despite its potential for development, the course taken by Sudan has failed to 
address the differences among its diverse ethnic communities and the problematic 
relationship between religion and politics. This has resulted in political instability 
and the absence of national consensus, leading ultimately to a lengthy civil war235 
between the Arab-dominated North and the Christian and animist South.236 Since 
its independence the country as witnessed many internal conflicts, including the 
longest in all of Africa237, and until today, stability hasn’t yet been achieved. 
This chapter provides an analysis of contemporary Sudan, outlining the social and 
political evolution of the State, emphasizing its post-independence period. Thus, 
an historical context, starting from its independence to the rise to power of its 
current government, will precede the focus on its major humanitarian crisis – the 
Darfur Crisis – its causes and effects, followed by the role of R2P and of the 
international community in averting this grave situation. Finally, the specific role 
of the ICC in the case of Sudan will be analyzed, so as to determine how influential 
an international court has become in obtaining justice, at a time where domestic 
authority is still the main performer. 
5.1. Historical Background 
Sudan derives its name from the Arabic bilad as-Sudan, meaning “land of the 
black”.238 Its capital is the city of Khartoum. The country shares borders with seven 
countries: Lybia, Chad and the Central African Republic to the West; Eritrea and 
Ethiopia to the East; South Sudan to the South; and Egypt to the North. Through 
the country passes the longest river in the world, the Nile while its eastern border 
is partially covered by the Red Sea.239 The present borders of Sudan, geopolitically 
speaking, make it a relatively recent nation. However, its parts have experienced 
different levels of state-building and centralized power. The northern region of the 
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country is well documented, has archaeological excavations and research have 
taken place in the area for many years. On the other hand, very little is known 
about the early history of the southern and western region of Sudan. Scholars 
divide the historical progress of the country into three main stages: ancient, 
medieval and modern. The ancient period spreads from antiquity until between the 
fourth or fifth centuries AD; the medieval ranges from the sixth to the eighteenth 
centuries AD, while the modern history of Sudan extends from the nineteenth 
century onwards.240 For the purposes of the scope of this thesis, which focuses 
primarily on the contemporary era, this investigation will center around the 
accounts from Sudan’s independence forward, particularly as of 1989. 
 
5.1.1. The independence of Sudan 
 
Sudan and Egypt, neighboring territories, have developed a relationship for 
thousands of years. From about 3000 BC, the northern region of Sudan (then 
known as Kush) became tangled with Egypt, which began to exercise considerable 
cultural and political influence on the region, at times ruling it as a province of 
Egypt. However, Egyptian hegemony over Sudan varied in military might and, at 
times, Sudan developed its own political structures. This period of Egyptian rule 
included two significant phases during the modern era.241 First, the Turko-
Egyptian era, from 1820 until 1885, when Egypt, which was at the time a province 
of the Ottoman Empire, invaded the region of Sudan and in a year had established 
what came to be known as the Turko-Egyptian regime in Sudan. The motivation 
behind this occupation was primarily a need for human and economic resources of 
Sudan, to boost the Egyptian ambitions of building an empire in the region and the 
city of Khartoum (current capital of Sudan) was established as the central 
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administration for the region.242 Second, the Anglo-Egyptian era began due to an 
increasing European presence in central Africa and in 1884, the Berlin Treaty, 
between the major European powers defined areas of influence between the 
various actors, leading Britain to act and reclaim the region.243 The Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium agreement concluded on January 9th, 1899, granted the 
British ruling over Sudan, however, acknowledging the fact that they could not 
rule Sudan directly as yet another colony, both nations compromised on a joint 
British and Egyptian that ruled Sudan until its independence244 on January 1st, 
1956.245 
Independent Sudan has had numerous changes in government, as consecutive 
government rulers found it difficult to win the general acceptance and support from 
the country’s largely diverse population.246 Since 1956, the country has seen three 
civilian parliamentary regimes (1956-58; 1965-69; 1986-89) and three military 
ones (1958-64; 1969-85; 1989-present), with each civilian regime being preceded 
by a transitional period (1953-56; 1964-65; 1985-86) conceived to terminate the 
previous regime and set up conditions for a new one, during which, mostly fair 
elections were conducted.247  
 
5.1.2. Internal divisions in Sudan 
 
To add to this political instability, before we move on to the next sub-chapter, it is 
essential for the understanding of the political conjecture of Sudan, to emphasize 
two distinct circumstances that have affected its history since even before its 
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independence: the religious/ethnical conflict and the division between the northern 
and southern territories of Sudan. 
5.1.2.1. Ethnical and religious divisions 
After the collapse of the Kingdom of Kush in the 4th century AD, the region of 
Nubia248, which today encompasses the areas between southern Egypt and central 
Sudan, was invaded by Ethiopia, resulting in the conversion of Nubia’s kingdom 
monarchs into Christianity. However, this only lasted until the 14th century, when 
the last Christian king of Nubia was defeated and the first Muslim Nubian King, 
Abdallah Barshambu, accedes to the throne of Dongola249, in 1317. Later, under 
the Funj and Fur Sultanates250, the northern and western parts of Sudan became 
Islamized and largely Arabized. This occurred through an extensive process that 
involved demographic movements, in particular the migration of Arab tribes into 
various parts of Sudan, as well as preaching and educational efforts of individual 
Muslim scholars.251 The Islamization and Arabization processes, which endured 
for about four centuries, reaching its prime during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, developed through three stages: 
1) The introduction of Islam through demographic movements and migration, 
political and commercial contacts, and eventually the conversion of the 
ruling Sultanates of Funj and Fur; 
2) The evolution of a more enthusiastic process of Islamization due to an 
expanding network of Muslim scholars, and; 
 
248 Annex 3: Map of the Nubia Region. 
249 Dongola was once a province in the upper Nubia region. Today is a town in northern Sudan. 
250 As the Arabs settled in the northern region, two indigenous kingdoms expanded in the central and 
western regions of Sudan. The Funj loosely organized domain. At its greatest extent, it reached from the 
southern part of the Nubian Desert (part of the Sahara, East of the Nile) to modern Khartoum and farther 
South toward the Ethiopian Highlands. The Funj converted to Islam but retained many traditional African 
rituals. In Western Sudan, the Fur imposed taxes on caravan goods traveling between western Africa and 
Egypt, developing a strong central government that dominated, among others, the region of Darfur. Like 
the Funj, the Fur adopted Islam and the rulers of both kingdoms took the Muslim title of sultans. (Childress, 
2010) 
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3) The adoption, within the Sudanese region, of Arabic and Islamic culture, 
especially in the north-central and western areas.252 
This continuous spread left little room for Christianity to endure. Rapidly, the 
majority of the population became both of Arabic culture and Islamic religion, with 
the 19th century marking the integration of Islam into the sphere of national 
politics, while the native Christian Africans were demoted to a minority with very 
few influences in the social, religious and political fields. 
5.1.2.2. The fracture between northern and southern regions 
The second context is the visible crack between northern Sudan and southern 
Sudan. Not much is known about the past of southern Sudan, though it’s clear that 
the region experienced a very different line of events from the south. Isolated 
because of natural barriers of mountains and rivers, the region was less exposed to 
external interference, preserving a unique social and cultural identity. Through the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the main cultural identities that describe the 
Sudanese regions in the present were virtually established: from the Arabic-Islamic 
alignment in the north-central region to the strong African orientation of the south 
and, between them, among other, a particular region retained its robust regional 
identity, Darfur.  
A crucial event that expanded this division between north and south was during 
the independence negotiations. Southern ambitions were not taken into 
consideration by either the British administration or the northern statesmen, as the 
negotiations towards self-government did not include a representative from the 
south. This meant that, since the beginning, Sudan has been ruled merely through 
northern directives, leading to an increase of isolation and ambition of self-rule in 
the south. This resulted in the First Sudanese Civil War, from 1955 until 1972, 
between northern and southern regions of Sudan, which demanded representation 
and an increase in regional autonomy. A succeeding civil war emerged in 1983 as 
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a continuation of the preceding conflict between the Sudanese government and the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)253, only ending with a peace 
agreement signed in 2005, that would forever change the course of Sudanese 
history.254 
 
5.1.3. The rise of Omar Al-Bashir into power 
 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was born on January 7th, 1944 in Hosh Bannaga, 
100 miles north of Khartoum, into a peasant family of Arabic origin.255 His family 
belongs to the Jaaliyyin, an ethnic group descendent from Arab immigrants who 
settled in the Nile Valley in the sixteenth century.256 After studying at the Egyptian 
Military Academy in Cairo, al-Bashir fought in the Yom Kippur war of 1973, as 
part of a joint Sudanese-Egyptian special forces group against Israel. In the 
following years, various military roles were undertaken, such as a military attaché 
in the UAE in 1975, or a tour duty in 1976 as part of the Arab League peacekeeping 
force in Lebanon257. In the 1980s his military career constantly progressed from 
garrison commander in 1979 to lieutenant colonel in 1980, full colonel in 1981 and 
commander of an armed parachute brigade, a post he held until 1987. During this 
period, he obtained a first master’s degree in military science from the Sudanese 
Command and Staff College in 1981 and a second master’s degree in military 
science in Malaysia, in 1983. As the Second Sudanese Civil War emerged, Al-
Bashir gained extensive combat experience fighting in the southern region of 
Sudan, spending three years posted internally, conducting counterinsurgency 
operations against the SPLA.258  
 
253 The armed wing of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).  
254 This peace accord (CPA) lead to a referendum which granted independence to the newly formed 
South Sudan. 
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In 1989, the country was in turmoil. The civil war had no ending at sight as 
southern forces were growing and demanding three things. First was the right to 
choose their own regional and local government, which was granted by the 
Sudanese constitution, but abolished during the military regime; second was a plea 
to end Sharia - a legal system based on the religious writings of Islam, imposed by 
the same military regime in 1983 - as most southerners were not Muslims but 
Christians or followers of a traditional African religion. The third demand was a 
fair distribution of wealth and economic development from Sudan’s natural 
resources.259  
When Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party, was democratically elected 
in 1986, as the 7th Prime Minister of Sudan, he promised peace and an end to the 
conflict. However, he did not keep his promise and instead, recruited new militias 
to fight against the south. In 1988, it was reported that around 250,000 Sudanese 
died from war, disease or hunger due to the conflict, while two or three million 
people were forced to flee their homes to avoid the conflict.260 As the war 
continued, the division between north and south was becoming greater and the 
people were becoming tired of the regime.261 Unsatisfied with the country’s 
leadership, al-Bashir lead a successful coup on the night of June 30th, 1989, 
announcing over the radio that a fifteen-member Revolutionary Command Council 
for National Salvation now ruled Sudan and he, “head of state, minister of defense 
and commander of the armed forces”, declared the Constitution suspended and all 
political parties dissolved.262 After the coup, the fallen northern politicians, 
including al-Mahdi were sent to prison and, amid rumors of a counter-coup, al-
Bashir locked up other potential opponents from inside the army, thus guaranteeing 
minimum objection to his rule.263  
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An essential element in the implementation of the new regime was a Muslim 
extremist and leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hassan al-Turabi, “the 
spiritual mentor of the revolution”. Al-Turabi played a crucial rule in the 
Islamization of the country and as an Islamic scholar, he believed in the 
Islamization of the south, instead of its separation. As any proposal had to be 
settled unanimously, his veto power ensured that southerners didn’t secure their 
requirements.264 Together, al-Bashir and al-Turabi began to Islamize the country, 
as the government was committed to making all Sudanese proper Arabs and 
Muslims through a vigorous program of Arabization and Islamization265 and, in 
March 1991 Islamic law (Sharia) was introduced266 further emphasizing the 
division between the north and the southern regions of Sudan. This process 
presupposed that Islam and Arabic embodied the foundation of the country’s 
national identity and therefore should outline its legal, political, cultural and 
economic systems.267 In October of 1993 when the Revolutionary Council was 
terminated, al-Bashir was appointed President of Sudan and, as head of the 
military, thus began a new military rule268, the third since Sudan’s independence 
in 1956. In the 1996 general elections, the first elections since 1986, al-Bashir was 
confirmed as President of Sudan. 
When the NIF came into power in 1989, the character of the State changed. The 
party transformed Sudan by seizing the wealth of the country, repressing civil 
society, enforcing an intolerant Islamist dogmatism on every facet of State and 
society, alienating Sudan’s Arab and African neighbors. The State waged a vicious 
war against its people, not only in through the mentioned north-south conflict but 
also across other regions of the country.269 
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Throughout this period, the Second Civil War between the central government and 
the SPLA endured, resulting in the displacement of millions of Sudanese people. 
Adding to the unfair application of Sharia law, the centralization of power on the 
government of Khartoum and the unequal treatment of the southern and western 
regions of Sudan, the dispute between sides grew fiercer when oil production and 
exportation started on a large scale, in 1999, specifically in the border area between 
north and south, thus aggravating the relationship between the government, the 
SPLA and all the other rebel forces fighting in the war.270  
Among the multiple consequences that result from an internal conflict such as a 
civil war, the mistreatment of civilians through the violation of their basic human 
rights has to be on top as the worst. The importance of understanding this issue lies 
with the State’s ability to act on its citizens, imposing its authority and order, 
regardless of the costs, because there were no real internal or external 
consequences to those actions. A military regime ruled by a central authoritarian 
government, that shares no power, no authority and no resources. Thus, the claim 
made by those who face it seems ever more legitimate, as the conflict grows. 
5.2. The Darfur Crisis and the violation of human rights in Sudan 
The incessant escalation of the conflict between the government of Sudan and the 
rebel factions lead to an event of tremendous proportions affecting the lives of 
millions of people in the region of Darfur. The NIF’s actions to enforce its 
dominance over the region, reorganizing the provincial political structure and 
replacing Darfur’s local leadership with NIF appointments loyal to President al-
Bashir, generated a significant backlash in the region. But this strategy backfired 
and a powerful challenge to his rule emerged from the region, leading him to 
employ the most brutal means to subdue the region.271 A humanitarian crisis struck 
in the region in 2003, gradually exposing not only the gross violations of human 
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rights and humanitarian law, particularly by militias backed by the government272 
but also the condemnable actions of the government in handling the situation. 
The main purpose of this chapter, through the analysis of this humanitarian crisis, 
is to understand how the government of Sudan was able to behave against 
international laws on human rights, becoming responsible for the death, injury, and 
displacement of millions of Sudanese civilians, while avoiding national and 
international condemnation for its actions, with the international community 
displaying a posture of apparent neutrality to these atrocities.273 By using the crisis 
in Darfur as the practical reference for this thesis, its focus lies on re-
conceptualizing the concept of State Sovereignty – “one that views sovereignty not 
as control but as responsibility”274 – laying the foundations for establishing 
appropriate international legal and policy responses, preventing future situations 
like the one in Darfur.  
Thus, this chapter will focus on examining both the causes and the effects that 
resulted from this humanitarian crisis, emphasizing the role played by the central 
government of Khartoum in the events of Darfur, in order to identify the demand 
for international intervention in cases which the government fails to act according 
to IHL. 
 
 
5.2.1. The Causes of the Darfur Crisis 
 
Located in the western region of Sudan275, bordering Libya, Chad, the Central 
African Republic, and South Sudan, Darfur is Sudan’s largest region comprising 
an area of approximately 250,000 square kilometers and an estimated population 
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of 6 million people276. This western part of the country is home to various ethnic 
groups, including the Furs277, Baggaras, Masalits, Zaghawas, and others, with the 
Fur and Masalit as the dominant ethnic groups.278 For years, the government of 
Sudan has favored the Arabic culture in Darfur, leading to suspicions by the leaders 
of the aforementioned ethnic groups. The distrust intensified when the El Mahdi 
government (1986-1989) armed Arab Baggara militias from Darfur and Kordofan 
(a present-day southern region of Sudan) known as “muraheleen”, using them as 
counterinsurgency forces against southern rebels.279 After taking power in the 1989 
coup, the NIF continued this policy, even incorporating many members of the 
militia into the national military as members of the Popular Defense Forces, 
despite their involvement in attacks against the local communities in Darfur, 
raiding, looting, enslaving and punishing civilians. 280 
The crisis in Darfur commenced in early 2003, largely as a result of action by rebel 
forces, particularly the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and later the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the members of whom come 
predominantly from the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes.281 These organized rebel 
forces accused the Arab-ruled government of Sudan of years of malign, neglect 
and oppression of black Africans in favor of Arabs, demanding that the Sudanese 
government address the political marginalization, the economic underdevelopment 
of the region and the discrimination towards African Darfurians.282 In April of 
2003, the SLA attacked government military forces at El Fasher, in North 
Darfur.283 Within a few months of the attacks, the region had come under assault 
from military and pro-government militias.284 As the government apparently did 
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not own sufficient military resources - as many of its forces were still located in 
the southern region of Sudan – the government supported a militia comprised of 
Arabic fighters, known as the “Janjaweed”, to respond to the rebellion.285 
Worryingly, what appears to have been an ethnically based rebellion, has been met 
with an ethnically based response, building in large part on long-standing tribal 
rivalries286. With the support of the government, the militias attacked villages, 
targeting civilian communities that share the same ethnicity of the rebel groups, 
killing, looting, destroying hundreds of villages and polluting water supplies.287 
By the end of 2003, some reports were published confirming that those 
government-backed militias were slaughtering civilians.288 A humanitarian 
disaster had just begun. 
So, what can we consider to be the causes responsible for the humanitarian crisis 
in Darfur?  
Darfurians share a lot in common, but most importantly they speak Arabic and 
they are all Muslims. However, some researchers and policymakers, as well as the 
media, misinterpret the underlying causes, attributing “ancient hatred” as the main 
responsible for most conflicts in Africa. In the case of Darfur, it is usually 
attributed to the ethnic hatred between Arabs and non-Arabs, as affirmed by the 
government itself, but it is argued here, that Darfur was a State-driven political 
conflict.289 Whereas many consider these situations of simple explanation, they are 
in fact complex cases, as “the most widely discussed explanations of ethnic 
conflict are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, simply wrong.”290 In most cases, the 
real causes of conflict and humanitarian crises are connected to political and 
economical power. In other words, conflict arises when a dispute for authority and 
control is at play, while the risk of losing that conflict can mean a loss of influence 
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and decision-making. Therefore politics are at the center of the issue, rather than 
hatred or competition for natural resources.291 As Elbadawi and Sambanis state, 
“deep political and economic failures – not tribalism or ethnic hatred – are the root 
causes of Africa’s problems”292, as ethnic conflicts are mostly caused by political 
grievance. 
It is possible to determine various causes responsible for each specific case of 
conflict: ethnic manipulation, chronic neglect, and marginalization, land grabbing, 
arms smuggling, government relying on militias, underdevelopment or lack of 
basic infrastructures – all boiling down to political accusations.293 However, in the 
case of Darfur, it is the political choices and the policies selected by the Sudanese 
government that lay the foundation for the rebellious mobilizations, through the 
lack of access to power, resources, and decision-making, and not an intrinsic ethnic 
hatred, that justifies the conflict. Thus, this struggle for political might translates 
into a challenge on the State’s ability to decide, a challenge on its sovereignty, 
leading this analysis to the responsibility of the sovereign, the government of 
Sudan and its President, Omar al-Bashir. 
5.2.2. The Responsibility of the State 
 
Accountability and responsibility must be the hallmark of any government294, as 
political goodwill, the institutionalization of inter-governmental relations and 
cooperation among parties is required to enforce conflict management processes 
in the country295. In the case of Sudan, interpreting the facts under international 
court jurisprudence – specifically the International Court of Justice (ICJ) -, gives 
reason to question the potential impact of allegations of responsibility for crimes 
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attributable to its government. Interpretations would differ depending on whether 
the government of Sudan acted according to these specific proceedings:  
1) If the government itself orchestrated attacks on the civilian population of 
Darfur; 
2) If the government negligently permitted individuals to have the appearance 
of state authority, while committing said attacks, or; 
3) If the government recklessly armed and unleashed those likely to attack 
civilian populations that oppose the government.296 
Another fundamental aspect is the extent of Sudan’s responsibility for its failure 
to act once the international community alerted the government of its inability or 
unwillingness to prevent large-scale killings and displacement of populations. This 
is particularly the case when international peacekeeping units are at the 
government’s disposal but forbids their entry, while the violations committed 
continue without impunity.297 Escalating the severity of the crisis rather than 
executing its primary responsibility to provide security and protection to the 
people, the government abandoned neutrality in Darfur, supporting the Sudanese 
and non-Sudanese Arabs298. The accountability of the government of Sudan arises 
from the overwhelming evidence that it is responsible for recruiting, arming and 
participating in joint attacks with militia forces, that have become the main 
instrument for the attacks on the civilian population of Darfur.299 
So, with government-backed militias as main perpetrators of the violence that has 
erupted this humanitarian crisis, it is important to investigate whether direct 
government accountability for the actions of said militias, that may or may not 
serve the interests of the government, is appropriate. International courts such as 
the ICJ, the ICTY, and others, have reviewed the standards for government 
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responsibility, based on its control over militia groups, in several cases. In 2007, 
the ICJ reviewed state responsibility for actions taken by militias in breach of 
humanitarian law. In the case concerning application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia-Herzegovina accused the former Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia of engaging in genocide and failing to prevent or punish 
genocide in contravention to the Genocide Convention, while claiming that Serbia 
had financially and strategically supported the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS)300, 
which had, among other things, engaged in the killing of people in the UN-
protected area of Srebrenica.301 Despite concluding that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
case lacked proof of Serbia’s control over the killings at Srebrenica, the ICJ did 
find that the Serbian government failed to exercise whatever authority it might 
have applied to prevent the reported atrocities. This omission constituted a failure 
to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.302 
Thus, operating the same line of thought, and assuming the truth regarding the 
actions of the Janjaweed militias against the Sudanese population and those 
militias’ connection to the government of Sudan, the international community has 
established that the government has failed to disarm these militias and to protect 
its population in Darfur from crimes against humanity, determining that the people 
responsible for these actions should be prosecuted, either at a national or an 
international level of justice.303 
However, the continuous effort of the government in blocking external 
humanitarian access to understand the situation has led to an absence of proof of a 
consolidated effort in which the government is taking part in the violent attacks 
committed by the militias in Darfur. Consequently, any action taken by the 
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international community would violate the sovereignty of the State, as States 
comprehend sovereignty to incorporate unilateral and unchecked control of all 
matters within the State304, thus limiting the actions of international courts in 
prosecuting any individual responsible for this humanitarian crisis, whether a low-
ranking member of the militia or a high-ranking member of the Sudanese 
government.  
5.2.3. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Sudan: the role of the international 
community 
 
After considerable advocacy by the UN and members of the ICISS, R2P was 
formed as a political agreement on the responsibility to protect, in 2005. States 
agreed that they have a responsibility to protect their population from specific 
human rights violations – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity -, as they have in preventing and responding to these mass 
atrocities.305 This sub-chapter will examine the application of R2P in the region of 
Darfur by the UNSC while acknowledging that in the end, it failed to achieve the 
most important objective – end the conflict in the region. 
When the scale of violence in Darfur became clear, many observers called it a test 
case for the R2P doctrine306, citing it as one basis for the necessity of an immediate 
response by the UNSC307. The crimes committed in Darfur are unquestionably 
defined as crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing, three of the 
four crimes covered by the R2P agreement308, as there have been divergent 
perspectives on the legal applicability of genocide to the case of Darfur309 (though 
this thesis defends that there’s a case to prove acts of genocide). As an effect, the 
Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first and only time, the UNSC referred to R2P 
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in a country-specific resolution, before 2011.310 It reaffirmed R2P and authorized 
the transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur to a UN 
peacekeeping force in 2006, as AMIS, a contingent of African Union (AU) 
peacekeepers deployed to monitor a ceasefire in 2004, was struggling to provide 
protection and security to civilians and its people, making donors unwilling to 
continue funding the mission311. This resolution authorized the expansion of the 
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which had previously operated in the 
south of Sudan, into Darfur to replace AMIS.  
Throughout the negotiations towards the drafting of Resolution 1706, there were 
two contentious points: mentioning R2P in the resolution and gaining consent from 
the Sudanese government. During this period, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
of 2006 had been signed but the government of Sudan still rejected any forces 
entering the country, hampering the UNSC’s position, since UN peacekeepers are 
premised on consent. The U.S. advocated the idea of authorizing the deployment 
of peacekeepers first and seeking consent afterward, which was, reluctantly, 
agreed by the U.K. and France, though there was no real sign that this would work, 
given the positions of the Sudanese government in rejecting UN peacekeepers, and 
of the Chinese government demanding that consent was required. An agreement 
was eventually established, as both R2P312 and consent appear in the resolution.313 
The Resolution 1706 was thus the first UNSC resolution to associate the R2P 
doctrine of the World Summit outcome document to a specific country. After the 
vote on the resolution, the majority of UNSC members spoke on the international 
responsibilities towards the situation in Darfur, though stressing the primary 
responsibility of the Government of Sudan to ensure the security of its citizens. 
This moment marked the recognition that the international community had 
 
310 Gifkins, 2015 
311 Gifkins, 2016a 
312 Resolution 1706 recalls “its previous resolutions [including] Resolution 1674 (S/RES/1674) on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document.” (UN Security Council, 2006) 
313 Gifkins, 2016b 
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responsibilities within Darfur and engagement with R2P.314 So, despite its impact, 
why did R2P end up failing the people of Darfur? 
R2P has not been successful in facilitating effective change when confronting 
internal conflict. The Darfur crisis provides evidence of R2P’s unsuccess, as 
Darfur’s population continues to suffer from mass atrocities, and the international 
community remains in disagreement over how to implement such an uncertain 
concept. The international community and its sovereign states initially failed 
Darfur by not taking action to ease the tension between the government and the 
rebels, which resulted in the start of the mass atrocities in 2003. Looked upon as a 
test case for R2P, the Darfur conflict demonstrates the international community’s 
failure to prevent mass atrocities and diffuse a serious situation before it became a 
conflict. Not only were no prevention measures taken, but international 
organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the UN, proved to be indecisive 
and timid when acting as peacekeepers in Darfur.315 
In theory, R2P serves to protect individual human rights, which has the potential 
to shift the current international order, however, R2P lacks a clear legal status in 
the international system and, therefore, fails to be effectively implemented, as 
exemplified in the Darfur conflict that erupted in 2003.316 Nonetheless, it would 
be wrong to dismiss Sudan’s problems as of little relevance because they precede 
the 2005 World Summit or because Sudan is so complex and inflexible. The 
international community’s failure to implement R2P in Sudan undermines its 
framework and challenges its efficiency going forward. International support to 
“capacity building” to avoid genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity can be crucial. But that aspect of R2P is less significant than 
acting upon the responsibility to respond decisively and on time, protecting 
 
314 Gifkins, 2016b 
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innocents where national authorities fail to. The ongoing failure in Sudan should 
be a wakeup call for advocates of R2P.317 
To support why R2P hasn’t had a successful contribution to the Darfur crisis, the 
next sub-chapter will analyze the aftermath of the humanitarian crisis and its 
effects on the population of Darfur.  
5.2.4. The Effects of the Darfur Crisis 
 
Since it erupted in 1983, the civil war between the central government in the north 
and the southern rebels has had a significant impact on Sudan. It is the longest 
conflict in Africa involving serious human rights violations and humanitarian 
disasters and, before its conclusion via peace agreement in 2005, the conflict 
registered more than 2 million deaths and 4.5 million people forcibly displaced 
from their homes.318 
Regarding the situation in Darfur, it is difficult to know the total mortality during 
the conflict in the region, partly because the government of Sudan initially blocked 
teams from the UN and other humanitarian agencies from entering the region and 
making such an estimate.319 However, at the five-year mark, in 2008, the Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, stated that as many as 
300,000 people had died in Darfur since early 2003, when the conflict began, 
including deaths from disease, malnutrition, reduced life expectancy, and direct 
combat.320 Aside from the death toll, more than 2.7 million Darfurians had been 
displaced, with around 260,000 refugees fleeing to the east of neighboring Chad.321 
Sudan’s U.N Ambassador Abdalmahmoud Abdalhaleem, in response to this 
 
317 Williamson, 2009 
318 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2004 
 
319 Udombana, 2005 
320 Up until 2018, this was the last UN update on mortality in the Darfur crisis. Now Ten Years Since the 
UN Offered a Mortality Estimate for the Darfur Genocide, at https://sudanreeves.org/2018/04/22/now-ten-
years-since-the-un-offered-a-morality-estimate-for-the-darfur-genocide/ 
321 At the five-year mark, Darfur crisis is only worsening – UN aid chief, at 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/04/256942-five-year-mark-darfur-crisis-only-worsening-un-aid-chief 
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report, considered the numbers grossly exaggerated, a reasonable extrapolation 
instead of a scientific estimate. As an alternative, Abdalhaleem said that the 
Sudanese government put the death toll at 10,000, only including combat death as 
they claim there is no famine nor an epidemic disease in Darfur.322  
In November of 2013, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) stated that in that year at least 460,000 people had fled their homes 
in Darfur, as a result of the conflict between government-backed troops and rebel 
movements.323 In his original analysis of mortality in August 2010, Eric Reeves324 
argued that the data and reports extant at the time indicated mortality had grown 
to 500,000 people in Darfur. However, on a more recent update to his previous 
study, the author argued in November 2016, that additional data and new reports 
ascertained the total mortality figure to 600,000 dead from direct or indirect effects 
of the mass atrocities in the region.325 
The years that followed the Darfur crisis immediately witness an international cry 
for a ceasefire between both parties and, apart from the crucial role played by the 
UNSC, the African community had an important part in establishing talks. The 
first international intervention came from the western neighbor Chad, who, 
concerned about the effects of conflict-induced displacement into its borders, 
helped mediate a ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the rebels in 
September 2003, which unfortunately didn’t last long. With AU assistance in 2004, 
Chad was able to mediate yet another ceasefire agreement to allow humanitarian 
access in Darfur. A year later, in January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed by the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, 
 
322 U.N. says Darfur dead may be 300,000 as Sudan denies, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-
darfur-un/u-n-says-darfur-dead-may-be-300000-as-sudan-denies-idUSN2230854320080422 
323 UN: 460,000 displaced in Darfur this year, at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/11/un-
displaced-violence-darfur-20131114132610566629.html 
324 Eric Reeves has spent the past seven years working full-time as a Sudan researcher and analyst, 
publishing extensively both in the US and internationally. He has testified several times before the congress, 
has lectured widely in academic settings, and has served as a consultant to a number of human rights and 
humanitarian organizations operating in Sudan. Working independently, he has written on all aspects of 
Sudan's recent history. At https://www.theguardian.com/profile/ericreeves. 
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ending the long conflict between the North and the South of Sudan, setting an 
independence referendum326 in Southern Sudan, which officialized on February 7th 
of 2011.327 This agreement, based on political power and oil-revenue sharing, 
marked the end of the Second Civil War in Sudan. 
Even though this peace process showed little impact on the conflict in Darfur, 
under pressure from the international community, the DPA, established with the 
intent of ending the conflict in Darfur, was signed by the government of Sudan and 
the SLM/A in Abuja, Nigeria, on May of 2006, however the agreement was 
rejected by the JEM. In 2007, a second Darfur Peace Conference is held in Libya, 
but ends with no agreement. Finally, in 2011, the Doha Document for Peace in 
Darfur, considered the Second Darfur Peace Agreement, is signed by the 
government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a Darfur 
rebel movement. This agreement guaranteed that the people affected by the 
conflict would be compensated adequately for the losses or damages sustained 
during the period of deprivation.328 
The numbers that represent the effect of the humanitarian crisis in the region of 
Darfur, translate an environment where government accountability and 
responsibility seem to scarce. In addition to its purposeful inaction, the 
humanitarian consequences of the conflict have been aggravated particularly by 
the refusal of the Sudanese government to allow unrestricted access to Darfur by 
humanitarian agencies.329 The figures presented above are the reflection of a 
military regime that has for years acted regardless of international laws on the 
protection of human rights. A regime that, due to a principle of non-intervention 
 
326 Southern Sudanese people vote 98.6 percent in favor of the South becoming an independent state in a 
referendum deemed free and fair by the international community. (Natsios, 2012) 
327The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations unfulfilled, at 
http://www.c-r.org/accord/sudan/darfur-peace-agreement-expectations-unfulfilled. 
328 National Legislative Bodies/ National - Sudan: Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), 
2012. 
 
329 Udombana, 2005 
Using the case of Sudan to understand how countries are still able, through the concept 
of State Sovereignty, to protect themselves from their human rights obligations. 
 
 
77 
 
in the so-called internal affairs of States, has been responsible for hundreds of 
thousands of killings, displacements, and misery, on a region that has, for decades, 
been treated as expendable. 
5.4. The ICC in Darfur 
The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been a groundbreaking 
step in the field of international criminal law towards ending impunity. It is the 
first criminal court with a potential universal jurisdiction, its grounds in the direct 
consent of States, independence from all other international organizations and the 
assistance of national criminal justice systems of all States parties to its founding 
treaty, the Rome Statute.330 Upon the inception of the ICC in 2002, the first case 
to be referred to it by the UNSC is the humanitarian and political crisis in Darfur331, 
as the indictment and issuance of arrest warrants of President Omar al-Bashir on 
March 3rd, 2009, by the Court, was a milestone for international criminal justice.    
As Sudan is not a party of the Rome Statute, the ICC was only able to investigate 
the situation in Darfur after, as mentioned above, the UNSC referred it to the Court, 
making this the first case taking place in a State that is not party to the Rome 
Statute, as well as the first case where charges were brought against an incumbent 
head of State. This sub-chapter seeks to provide a general overview of the ICC’s 
role in attempting to prosecute the main responsible for the mass atrocities 
committed in Darfur since 2003.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC announced the issuance of an arrest warrant 
against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in relation to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur, as a response to the UNSC’s 
Resolution 1593, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, submitting the 
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situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC, following Article 13(b) of the 
Rome Statute.332 333 
However, the government of Sudan and President al-Bashir have denied taking 
part in the conflict, arguing that the violence in Darfur is due to a local ethnic 
conflict and that the numbers of victims estimated by international organizations 
are greatly inflated. In return, the government has used the arrest warrants has an 
excuse to expel several humanitarian organizations, claiming they were 
cooperating with the ICC. To add to this, the decision to indict al-Bashir has 
received criticism from African actors such as the AU and most African States, 
while the Arab League has also rejected the Court’s actions, calling for its 
members not to cooperate with it,334 on the basis that it would jeopardize the 
prospects of peace.335 
So, does the ICC have the legal basis to prosecute President al-Bashir? 
The Rome Statute attributes the Court with the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over people responsible for the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community. Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute provides “that the Court has 
jurisdiction to try most serious crimes, including the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression”.336 In doing this, 
however, the Court has to exercise its functions and jurisdiction as laid down in its 
Statute, particularly on the territory of States Parties or under a special agreement 
with the Court as established in Article 4 of the ICC Statute.337 
 
332 The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with 
the provisions of this Statute if […] A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 (article 13). 
333 Nkusi, 2013 
334 Jyrkkio, 2012 
335 Mohochi, 2010  
336 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 (article 5(1))  
337 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 (article 4(2)) 
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Concerning high ranking State officials, the Court expresses its prime focus to 
eliminate impunity through Article 27, which provides: “This Statute shall apply 
equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor 
shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. Immunities 
or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising 
its jurisdiction over such a person.”338 As a result, the Rome Statute removes 
immunities of State officials, uncluding heads of State, eliminating both immunity 
ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae, attached to State officials, 
regardless of their part with international crimes.339 
However, it is fundamental to understand whether under the legal framework of 
the ICC, a particular State, irrespective of being a non-party of the Statute, is bound 
by the removal of immunity determined by Article 27. Considering this, it must be 
acknowledged that the establishment of the Court by the Rome Statute was built 
through a treaty-based obligation, as, under Article 27(2), “states parties have 
agreed […] to waive their right to procedural immunities under customary 
international law.”340 Although ratifying a treaty creates an obligation, according 
to international law, the same obligations cannot be extended to non-State parties 
in the absence of their express consent, as established by Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which provides that “A treaty does 
not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”341 As a 
non-State party is not bound by treaty-based obligations, the jurisdiction of the 
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ICC can only be extended to individuals of State parties and within those 
territories.342 
State-parties have an obligation to cooperate with the Court, since it does not have 
mechanisms to enforce its decision, depending mainly on the cooperation of States 
to arrest and surrender the suspected official to the custody of the ICC. By the 
principle of pact sunt servanda, states parties to the Rome Statute are obliged to 
comply with the ICC pursuant to Article 26 of the VCLT, which provides that 
“[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith”. However, the obligation to cooperate in respect of the ICC’s 
request to arrest and surrender President al-Bashir, protected by immunity, would 
be violating international law on immunities of officials from non-party States to 
the ICC Statute.343 Even though it is an obligation to cooperate with the ICC, 
arresting President al-Bashir would breach customary international law on 
immunities possessed by sitting head of State.344 Assuming the complexity on the 
issue of breaking immunity, entitled to an incumbent head of State, hasn’t allowed 
the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially, at least as long as al-Bashir 
remains President.345 
So, in the particular case of Sudan, if the international nature of the ICC is 
incapable of breaking the immunity of a non-State party nor it effectively enforces 
cooperation of State-parties due to international customary laws, can the UNSC 
and its Resolution 1593 actually be effective in achieving the ICC’s objective of 
capturing President al-Bashir? 
According to Article 24 of the UN Charter, the UNSC has “primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security”346, while Article 25 states 
that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
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decisions of the Security Council”347, explaining that the UNSC relied on the 
obligation derived on the above articles to adopt the binding Resolution 1593 under 
Chapter VII, obliging Sudan to comply with the ICC request, since it is a Member 
State of the UN, irrespective of being a non-party State of the Rome Statute.348 
However, irrespective of whether Sudan is bound by the UN Charter via Article 
25, the resolution does not make Sudan totally lose its sovereign powers to decide 
otherwise about the arrest warrant by the ICC. In any case, Sudan is a non-party 
State, not bound by the Rome Statute and, if the international community, 
particularly the UNSC, demands Sudan to cooperate with the ICC, it would 
implicitly subject Sudan to the Statute and making Statute binding on it.349 
As long as President al-Bashir remains as head of State, Sudan will continue to 
oppose the obligation to cooperate, because as non-party State to the Rome Statute, 
the Court lacks jurisdiction over crimes committed in Darfur, while al-Bashir 
benefits from immunities under international customary law. A major instrument 
at the favor of this military regime, allowing him to escape justice for the violations 
committed in Darfur, is sovereignty. The concept enables not only immunity from 
international persecution, but also hinders external interference in the internal 
affairs of the State, even if that means not acting towards the protection of civilians 
and their human rights. The jurisdiction attributed to the ICC showcases why so 
many State actors have clung so thoroughly to the concept of State Sovereignty 
and continue to do so. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Throughout this thesis, we examined how the concept of State Sovereignty has 
changed, allowing States and State actors to escape justice and prosecution for 
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violations of human rights. Because of this, greater and more effective intervention 
by the international community is crucial. 
Using the particular case of Sudan and its continuous humanitarian crisis in Darfur, 
we were able to conclude that despite the growing interdependence and 
compliance with international standards, the international legal system is still, in 
some cases, unable to overlap the sovereignty of States, towards the pursuit of 
peace and security in the most affected regions of the world. 
For this reason, this work focuses highly on understanding why some States still 
justify their actions in the name of sovereignty - even if it means violating basic 
human rights -, stressing the importance of sovereignty as a responsibility to 
protect, rather than a mechanism of power and authority. It emphasizes the 
continuous rise of the number of killings and displacements in Darfur as a prime 
effect of the Sudanese government’s actions, as the international community is 
unable to intervene and stop the conflict. As an answer to this, this thesis analyzes 
the norm of R2P as an example to follow in the struggle against the damaging traits 
of sovereignty, not only making States responsible for any situation involving 
human rights violations within their jurisdiction but also giving the international 
community the authority and responsibility to act, when States can’t or won’t. 
Today, 17 years after the events in Darfur officially began, action on Sudan is 
being taken; first with the ousting of former-President al-Bashir, his sentence to 
prison, and a possible trial before the ICC coming soon. However, a lot has still to 
be done for the people that have suffered from this grave humanitarian catastrophe 
as the international community must now focus their efforts on “breaking” 
sovereignty, through compliance with accountability mechanisms such as the R2P 
and judicial means such as the ICC. 
Hopefully this thesis might work as a beacon of light over the countless situations 
that involve human rights violations in the world, promoting a reflection on the 
matter and inspiring future investigations.  
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